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Realizing Global Environmental Objectives through Local Environmental Initiatives:
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ABSTRACT
Since the early 1990s, dozens of projects have been established and millions of dollars have been
invested in jointly-implementated forest carbon sequestration projects in both Annex Band non-
Annex B countries. This prompts the question of why, without mandatory emission reduction
requirements or promise of any return on their investment in emission reduction credits,
governments, companies, and individuals have invested in projects to reduce their greenhouse
gas emissions.
To explore this question, I investigated the incentives behind stakeholder participation in three
voluntary carbon sequestration projects: the Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project in
Belize, the Klinki Forestry Project in Costa Rica, and the Profafor/F ACE Forestry Project in
Ecuador. Based on a site visit to Belize and telephone interviews with stakeholders in Costa
Rica and Ecuador, I determined that stakeholders participated in these projects because of both
the potential international market in emissions reduction credits and the more immediate and
local economic, social, and evironmental benefits of the projects.
Despite the numerous incentives to participate in forest carbon sequestration projects, there are
still many inherent uncertainties in both the process and the politics of carbon sequestration. A
number of general uncertainties regarding project design, international policy, the market in
carbon offset credits, and host country capacity still need to be addressed in order to lower
transaction costs and advance the development of forest carbon sequestration projects.
The primary principle that I have determined from my research is that in order for jointly
implemented forest carbon sequestration projects to be successful, the benefits that a landowner
receives, either indirectly through environmental benefits such as reduced erosion or watershed
protection, or directly through income from the project or from timber sales, need to
continuously equal or exceed the opportunity cost of land on which the forest is planted
throughout the project life. The fundamental challenge of carbon sequestration projects is to
create a dynamic system that gives adequate long-term returns and flexibility to landowners
while maintaining a certain level of carbon sequestration and security for investors.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 The Problem - Climate Change
Climate change is one of the most daunting problems facing the world today. The
Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change's Third Assessment Report, Climate Change 2001, states that
the global average surface temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C between 1990 and 2100.
This is a much larger increase than the observed changes during the 20th century, and is very likely to be
without precedent during at least the last 10,000 years.l
Figure 1 - Global Temperature Change2
Despite the many uncertainties
regarding the magnitude and character of
natural climate variability, the Report
concludes that there is "new and stronger
evidence that most of the observed warming
over the last 50 years is likely due to
increases in greenhouse gas concentrations
due to human activities.") It extends this time
frame by stating that the warming over the
past 100 years was very unlikely to have been
due to internal variability alone, and that
reconstructions of climate data for the past
1,000 years also indicate that this warming
was unusual and is unlikely to be entirely
natural in origin.4
20001800
I ~a.-om tlmnomel9rs.1
1600
Yar
GLOBAL
140012001000
NORTHERN HEMISPHERE
0.5
-0.8 L....-~--'----'----'_-'---....l.----'---L_'---'--~---'-_O"---»
1860 1880 1000 1920 1940 1900 1 0 2000
Year
-1.0
Variations of the Earth's surface temperature for:
(a) the past 140 years
0.8 r--.....-~---,.----.r----.,.----r---.---.--.---.--.----.--.-- ....
Greenhouse gases, which keep the
earth warm by absorbing some of the thermal
radiation emitted by the earth's surface, have
been building up in the atmosphere in
unprecedented amounts. The atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, has increased by 31% since 1750.5
I IPCC. "Summary for PoJicymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 13.
2 IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 3.
3 IPCC. "Synthesis Report," Climate Change 2001,2001: Que tion 9.
4 IPCC. "Summary for PoJicymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 10.
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The present concentration of C02 in the atmosphere, which now stands at over 365 parts per million, has
not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years, and was not likely exceeded during the past 20 million
years. In addition, the current rate of increase of C02 in the atmosphere is unprecedented during at least
the past 20,000 years.6
Figure 2 - Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide Concentrations'
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1.2 The Response - the International Climate Change Regime
1.2.1 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
One international response that has linked these two issues is the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), signed by 154 countries in 1992 during the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. As stated in Article 2
(Objective), the goal of this Convention is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.,,9
Article 4 (Commitments) of the Convention calls on all developed countries and Annex 1 countries (the
24 original OECD countries, the European Union, and 11 countries with economies in transition) to
reduce their GHG emissions to 1990 levels as a way to achieve this goal.
5 IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 7.
6 IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 7.
'IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 6.
8 World Resources Institute and The World Conservation Union (IUCN). 1998: Overview.
9 UNFCCC. 1992: Article 2 - Objective.
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1.2.2 The Role of Carbon Sequestration
Along with reducing GHG emissions by addressing sources, the FCCC stresses the role of
removing GHG emissions by sinks. Article 4.1 d of the FCCC states that Parties should "Promote
sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems.,,1D
Figure 3 - The Global Carbon Cyclell
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For the purposes of reducing GHG emissions, carbon sequestration involves a flux of carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere into sinks of carbon on land or in the oceans, where it cannot interact
directly with the climate system and cause climate change. While the oceans represent the largest
potential sink for sequestration of C02 emissions, it is almost impossible to naturally increase the uptake
of carbon from the atmosphere by the oceans. The two current strategies for artificially enhancing ocean
carbon sequestration are:
• Enhancement of net oceanic uptake from the atmosphere by fertilization of phytoplankton with
micro- or macronutrients
10 UNFCCC. 1992: Article 4 - Commitments.
11 Bolin and Sukumar. 200 1: 30.
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• Direct injection of a relatively pure C02 stream to ocean depths greater than 1000 meters.
However, the long-term effectiveness and potential environmental consequences of either of these
strategies are unknown.12
Forests, agricultural lands, and other terrestrial ecosystems represent the next largest sink for
sequestration of C02 emissions. These ecosystems have the ability to absorb a significant amount of
carbon at relatively low social costs through the growth of plants and the accumulation of carbon in the
soil.13 There are three main ways in which terrestrial ecosystems can be managed to influence the global
carbon cycle:
• Conservation of existing carbon stocks in forests and other ecosystems, including soils, which
would avoid emissions. An example is reducing the rate of deforestation.
• Sequestration of additional carbon in forests and other ecosystems, as well as in soils, forest
products, and landfills. An example is planting trees on land that has not been forested in the past
(afforestation).
• Substitute renewable biomass fuels for fossil fuels (fuel substitution), or use biomass products to
replace products such as steel or concrete that require more energy in their production and use
(materials substitution).14
Although not necessarily permanent, conservation and sequestration of carbon in terrestrial
ecosystems may allow time for other options to be further developed and implemented. Also, by
conserving existing carbon stocks and by increasing the size of carbon stocks through sequestration,
atmospheric C02 concentrations could be significantly reduced. The IPCC Second Assessment Report
estimated that about 60 to 87 GtC could be conserved or sequestered in forests by the year 2050.15
Hypothetically, if all of the carbon released by historical land-use changes could be restored to the
terrestrial biosphere over the course of the century (e.g., by reforestation), C02 concentrations would be
reduced by 40 to 70 ppm.16
1.2.3 The Concept of Joint Implementation
Since reductions in the total amount of atmospheric C02 occur regardless of where the actual
reductions or sequestrations take place, one of the mechanisms by which the Annex 1 countries' voluntary
commitments could be met is through joint implementation. At the initiative of Norway, the FCCC
approved - in principle - of activities between countries to collectively reduce GHG emissions or
12US DOE Office of Science website. "Carbon Sequestration Focus Areas."
13Kauppi and Sedjo. 2001: 303.
14Marland and Schlamadinger. June 2000: 6.
15Kauppi and Sedjo. 2001: 303.
16IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers," Climate Change 2001, 2001: 12.
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promote the sequestration of atmospheric C02.17 The investing participants in these projects could
presumably claim emission reduction "credits" for activities financed in another country, which could
then be deducted from their country's total amount of GHG emissions. Article 4.2a of the Convention
specifies that developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I "may implement such
policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the
achievement of the objective of the Convention.,,18 The overall rationale of joint implementation is that
the marginal costs of emission reduction or C02 sequestration can vary dramatically, and that such costs
are generally lower in developing nations than industrialized countries. This is especially true for forestry
projects, because of lower land and labor costs, and higher plant growth and therefore carbon
sequestration rates in the tropics.
Although such crediting arrangements were not officially endorsed by the FCCC, this promise of
potential transfers by jointly implementing projects initiated several bilateral and multilateral emissions
reduction projects. During the two years between UNCED and the First Conference of Parties (COP-I) in
1995, an average of 3.3 new forest-related joint implementation projects and $50 million were committed
yearly. The average price (usually equating costs) paid for carbon sequestration is estimated to be around
$1.97/tC ($0.53/tC02), a 10-fold increase from the prices paid before the FCCC was signed.I9
1.2.4 Activities Implemented Jointly
At the 1995 COP-1 in Berlin, a pilot phase was initiated to advance the concept of joint
implementation. Projects initiated during this pilot phase are called Activities Implemented Jointly (All)
projects. The guidelines adopted at Berlin mandated that countries participating in All projects would not
receive emission reduction credit during the pilot phase, although the possibility still exists that credit
could be awarded retroactively.20
The absence of credit transfer substantially decreased the number of new joint implementation
projects. Between late 1994 and late 1996, only three new AD forestry projects were initiated, with an
average yearly committed investment of $6 million. The willingness to pay for carbon also declined,
down to an average of $0.59/tC ($0. 16/tC02). However, while fewer investments occurred during this
phase, the supply of "potential projects" continued to increase as more companies became interested in
offsetting their GHG emissions. Also, an increasing number of developing countries began to recognize
these projects as a potential new source of capital for sustainable development,21
17 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: 4.
18 UNFCCC. 1992: Article 3 - Principles.
19 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: 5.
20 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 5.
21 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: 6.
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During 1997, four new forestry projects were initiated. While the level of investment remained
low ($4.5 million per year), the price paid for carbon raised to an average of $12/tC ($3.24/tC02) in
anticipation of the announcement of formal emissions reduction commitments at COP-3 in Kyoto,
Japan.22
Figure 4 - History of jointly implemented projects (data not from official sources)23
Pre-UJKed Pre-CoP 1 AU PP Pre-Kyoto Post-Kyoto
Number new projects per year 0.5 3.3 I.S 4 14
Area of new projects (haIyear) 93,000 628,467 501,740 893,000 2,002,082
Investment committed (USS millions/year) 1.00 49.25 6.05 4.48 347.00
Carbon price (US$lton 9 0.19 ).97 0,59 11.07 > 12.00
Pre-UNCED = before 1992; Pre-CoP 1 = phase between UNCED and the liltConference of Parties to the FCCC,
1992 to 1995; AU PP = Activities Implemented Jointly Pilot Phase, from 1995 to 1996; Pre-Kyoto == 1997;
Post-Kyoto = January to Jooe 1998.
1.2.5 The Kyoto Protocol
With increasing pressure to formalize the voluntary commitments that were pledged in 1992,
representatives from 160 countries gathered in December 1997 at COP-3 to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol
to the FCCC. After much deliberation, agreement was reached on binding commitments that required
Annex 1 countries to reduce their overall emissions of the six major greenhouse gases by 5.2% between
2008 and 2012. The Protocol approved the use of four "flexibility mechanisms" to facilitate the
achievement of these emissions reduction targets. These are commonly known as Bubbles, Emissions
Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism.
• Bubbles allow groups of countries to cooperatively address their emission reduction commitments
by trading among themselves if they agreed to do so at Kyoto. The European Community is an
example of such a bubble.24
• Emissions Trading, also known as QELRO (Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction
Obligation) trading, allows Annex B25 countries that reduce emissions below their commitment
level to sell their excess emission reduction units to other Annex B countries.
• Joint Implementation (JI) allows Annex B countries to acquire Emission Reduction Units (ERUs)
from investments in emissions reduction projects located in other Annex B countries in order to
supplement domestic actions.
22 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: 7.
23 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: Appendix.
24 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 5.
25 Countries with QELROs. At this point, Annex B countries are almost the same as Annex 1 countries.
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• The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows Annex B countries to acquire Certified
Emission Reduction (CER) credits for investment in emissions reduction projects in non-Annex B
countries to supplement domestic action while promoting sustainable development in non-Annex
B countries?6 A newly formed central authority will regulate the criteria for the CDM?7
Since the Kyoto Protocol, the latest Conference of Parties (COP-7 in Marrakech) has specified
that afforestation and reforestation are eligible activities for 11and CDM projects. Forest management is
also an eligible activity for a 11project. By supporting these activities, the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility
mechanisms will help to reduce both greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation.
1.3 Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
Since the early 1990s, dozens of projects have been established and millions of dollars have been
invested in jointly-implementation forest carbon sequestration projects in both Annex B and non-Annex B
countries. This prompts the question of why, without any formal obligation, governments, companies,
and individuals have invested in projects to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions without mandatory
emission reduction requirements or promise of any return on their investment in emission reduction
credits.
To explore this question, I have chosen to investigate the incentives behind stakeholder
participation in three voluntary carbon sequestration projects. These projects are illustrative of the way
local environmental action takes place in response to the global environmental objective of mitigating
climate change. They also show an avenue of multi-stakeholder cooperation that is still being worked out
as a way to respond to climate change. The projects are the Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project
in Belize, the Klinki Forestry Project in Costa Rica, and the ProfaforlF ACE Forestry Project in Ecuador.
1.3.1 Belize - the Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project
The Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project in Belize is one of the first fully funded forest-
sector projects implemented under the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation (USI1I), and is a result of
cooperation between The Nature Conservancy, Programme for Belize (a Belizean environmental NGO),
Winrock International (a forest carbon monitoring firm), the Government of Belize, and the electric utility
and energy companies Cinergy, Detroit Edison, Nexen, PacifiCorp, Suncor, Wisconsin Electric Power
Company, and the Utili tree Carbon Company. The project is expected to reduce, avoid or mitigate an
estimated 2.4 million tons of carbon during the project's 40-year life through two primary approaches: the
26 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 5.
27 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: 7.
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purchase of 13,300 hectares of land to prevent deforestation and sustainable forest management on a
combined total of over 52,000 hectares.
1.3.2 Costa Rica - the Klinki Forestry Project
The Klinki Forestry Project in Costa Rica is also a USIJI-approved project, but it differs from Rio
Bravo in that it involves transforming low-carbon pastures into high-carbon farm forests of mixed native
and naturalized species that includes the Klinki pine, a fast-growing non-native tree species suitable for
use as utility poles and lumber. The stakeholders involved in this project include Reforest the Tropics (a
US non-profit organization that supports forest carbon sequestration projects by linking American C02
emitters with Costa Rican farmers), individual and collective groups of farmers, and a number of
technical assistance providers, including the Cantonal Agricultural Center of Turrialba (an Ecuadorian
farmer-managed non-profit agency that helps develop farm forestry), the US Department of Agriculture
Forest Products Laboratory, the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, and the Tropical
Agriculture Research and Higher Education Center. The benefactors of Reforest the Tropics are a diverse
group of small businesses, institutions, and individuals. They include Connecticut College, the Mohegan
Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative, Superior Nut
Company, S1.Mark's Church of New Canaan, several Connecticut elementary, middle, and high schools,
and a number of private individuals. Lastly, the Government of Costa Rica is involved through its Office
on Joint Implementation (OCIC). The project hopes to sequester an average of 8.2 tons of carbon per
hectare on 6,000 hectares over the project's 40-year lifetime. However, so far the project has only
solicited enough funding for the planting of 87 hectares.
1.3.3 Ecuador - the FACE/Profafor Forestry Project
The FACE/Profafor project in Ecuador was established for the purpose of afforestation, primarily
on the high slopes of the Andes where deforestation began during the rise of the Incas. The land is being
afforested using a mixture of non-native (mostly pine and eucalyptus) and native tree species via
collaboration between FACE (Forests Absorbing Carbon dioxide Emissions - a Dutch non-profit
foundation that manages forest carbon sequestration projects), Profafor (Programa FACE de Forestacion
- FACE's counterpart in Ecuador), and individual and collective groups of farmers and indigenous
communities. SGS International, the world's largest inspection, verification, and testing organization,
verifies and certifies the carbon sequestered by the project, which originated from an agreement signed in
1993 between FACE and the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment to plant 75,000 hectares of forest. As
of January 2001, 25,200 hectares were under contract, but have not yet entirely been planted.
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1.4 The Incentives behind Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
Global warming is the epitome of a global commons issue. It affects all states, and requires broad
international cooperation to mitigate its effects. However, the institutions that currently exist to manage
the problem of climate change have been found to be sorely inadequate to deal with the magnitude and
the immediacy of the responses required to avoid dangerous changes in the world's climate system.
Climate change, as a trans boundary threat, cannot be addressed solely by national policy, and
international treaties leave open the possibility for significant free rider problems. As a case in point, the
USA, which is the world's largest of emitter of greenhouse gases, is refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
and so would not be under any obligation by any higher authority to do anything about climate change.
This exposes the need for the international community to develop different strategies and mechanisms to
deal with global environmental issues. These case studies are examples of initiatives that either pre-empt
or go beyond institutionalized legal and political approaches in order to solve global environmental
problems.
Through these case studies, I show how global environmental objectives are realized through
local environmental initiatives, and expound on the role that multi-stakeholder partnerships have in
facilitating what are necessarily local solutions to global problems. More specifically, I determine the
incentives that each of the stakeholders in the three carbon sequestration projects had to participate in
these projects. Through this analysis, I uncover the structures and motivations that are needed to promote
these kinds of participatory and mutually beneficial partnerships in other projects within the context of the
Kyoto Protocol as well as in the context of other multilateral environmental agreements.
1.5 Summary of Chapters
In Chapter 2, I discuss the four main types of forest carbon sequestration projects and their place
in the current climate change regime. I also examine forest carbon sequestration's role in sustainable
development, in particular its relationship to forest resources and biodiversity. In Chapter 3, based on
field research conducted in Belize during January 2002, telephone interview with Rio Bravo investors,
telephone interview with stakeholders in Costa Rica and Ecuador, and secondary research on all three
projects and forest carbon sequestration projects in general, I describe my three case studies to show why
and how, despite much uncertainty, carbon sequestration projects have been implemented. In Chapter 4,
based on these case studies, I present the factors that have most clearly indicated why forest carbon
sequestration projects have been initiated voluntarily, discuss the uncertainties that are keeping more
projects from taking place, and speculate on the importance of these factors for the establishment of forest
carbon sequestration projects in general. In Chapter 5, I extract a set of principles and recommendations
16
from my research that could be used by prospective stakeholders interested in forest carbon sequestration
projects. I use the case of a fossil-fuel power plant in Massachusetts looking for carbon offsets to
purchase as an example, since Massachusetts has recently passed laws that require certain older power
plants as well as new plants to reduce and/or offset their C02 emissions. I conclude in Chapter 6, where I
will summarize my findings and discuss their implications on the future of forest carbon sequestration.
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Country Project Type Discount Rate' Net Cost/ton of carbon offset
(SUS 1997)"
Brazil 12%
Plantation: PUlp .7.2
Plantation: Charcoal -0.5
Plantation: Sawlogs .14.7
Forest Management Net Carbon Loss
Thailand 10%
National Parks 1.7 to 3.3
Wildlife sanctuaries 2.3 to 4.3
Watershed Protection Areas 0.9 to 5.4
Community Woodlot: Eucalyptus 1.0
Semi.Public Plantation: Eucalyptus -3.8
Private.Sector Plantation: Eucalyptus -13.0
Semi.Public Plantation: Teak -2.5
Community Plantation: Teak .18.5
Agroforestry: EucalyptuslMalze -1.2
Agrororestry: Eucalyptuslfrult Trees .25.6
Tanzania 10%
Protected Area 1.3
Agroforestry: Eucalyptus/Malze .1.8
Public Plantation: Eucalyptus 0.1
China NOllndlcated
Plantation -12.4 to 1.8
Agroforestry -13.1 to .1.4
Mellico 10%
Natural Forest Management: Temperate .8.3
India 12%
National Parks 10.4
Natural Regeneration of Degraded Forest (wI Harvesting) .1.8
Enhanced Regeneration of Degraded Forest (wI Harvesting) .0.4
AgrofQrestry -4.5
Community Woodlot -0.8
Sort Wood Plantations -1.6
Timber Plantation .0.6
._ .....__ ....,--..-_.._ .._-..-.- ....-
............ , ..... ~ ... fttI.
_'_ ...... D._J._lW ... _ .. C_C ..... _-,u."'-"'_.,...-.-.._~ ..__ua._-.,----.....--. ...
Chapter 2 - Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
2.1 Types of Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
Figure 5 - Estimated Net Costs of Carbon Offset Measures28
Forest carbon
sequestration projects were
among the first jointly
implemented projects to be
initiated due to their low cost
and high number of secondary
benefits. Since the uncertainty
regarding climate change
negotiations and the
creditability of forest carbon
sequestration projects was high
when many projects were first
established in the early 1990s,
these qualities were important
in getting stakeholders
involved in forest carbon
sequestration. Qualities such
as sequestration rates, costs,
and secondary benefits vary
widely depending on the host
country, the ecosystem of the
project area, and the type of
forest carbon sequestration
project. The choice of ecosystem affects sequestration rates in that trees generally absorb more carbon in
tropical areas than in temperate areas. While there is a wide range of costs, mitigation through forestry is
generally much cheaper than other alternatives. Costs range from $0.10-$20/tC ($0.03-$5.40/tC02) in
some tropical developing countries to $20-$100/tC ($5.40-$27.00/tC02) in developed countries because
of higher land prices and wages. Costs would be expected to rise if large areas of land were taken from
28 Totten. 1999: 28.
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alternative use.29 Figure 5 gives an example of the prices per ton of carbon offset for different forest
carbon sequestration projects in a range of developing countries.
Of the over two dozen jointly implemented forest carbon sequestration projects in existence
today, four main types of projects have emerged.30 These are: Afforestation, Reforestation, Conservation,
and Sustainable Forest Management.
Figure 6 - Jointly Implemented Forestry Projects 1990 - 199831
- -
Project name Date Carboa Am Host IDvestor Projert description
prop,*,,' offset (11a) CmlJltry ~oelltry
Initiated !UtHtC)
AES- Care 1990 10,500 186,000 Guatemala USA A 2I'oforestry
Face Malavsia J992 4,250 25,000 IMalavsia Netherlands Enrichment DJantiwz
Face-Kroknose 1992 3,080 16,000 CzeckR. Netherlands Park rehabilitation
Face Netherlands 1992 BB5 5,000 Netherlands Netherlands Urban forestry
ICSB-NEP 1 1992 56 1,400 Malaysia USA Reduced Impact LORRinR
AES - Ox.fam - Coica 1992 15,000 1,500,000 Sowth USA Forest protection
America
AES Nature Cooservancy 1992 15,380 58,000 1- USA Forest ProtectiOD ..
Face-Profafor 1993 9,660 7S,OOO Ecuador Netherlands Small farmers DlaDtation foresarv
RUSAFOR-SAP 1993 79 450 Russia USA Plantation forestry
Face UWlIlda 1994 6,750 27,000 URaDda Netherlands Forest rehabilitation
Rio Bravo 1994 1,300 87,000 Belize USA Forest and mannement
Cmu. 1994 2,000 91,000 Co~Rica USA Forest protection, and
mana~ement
EcolaDdlTeDaSb .... 1995 350 2,500 Costa Rica USA Forest conservation
ICSB-NEP 2 1996 39 980 Malaysia USA Reduced ImDact L~~~
Noel KempffM. J996 J4,OOO 1,000,000 Bolivia UKIUSA Forest conservation and
manBRCment
Klinki forestry . 1997 1,600 87;000 CostaRka USA Reforestation with klinki
BudUnaFaso 1997 67 300.000 Burkia.a Faso Deomark Fire wood community forestry
Scolel Te 1997 IS 13.000 Mexic:o UKJFrance Community forestrv
PAPOCIC 1997 J8,OOO 570,000 Co9ta'Rka Norway, USA Forest conservation
Norway-Costa Rica 1997 230 4,000 Costa Rica Norway Forest rehabilitation and
conservation
Tesco ....-.....trnl" 1998 aa. &La. Undefined UK Fore!dry
Green fleet initiative 1997 n.a. n.a Australia Australia Reforestation
lAES - Ilha Bananal 1998 n.a. D.&. Brazil USA Forest rehabilitation
INsw +Pacific ~ower +Delta 1998 69 1.041 Australia Australia Refores1ation
Electricitv
Wodd Bank Prototype Carboa 1998 n.a. u.a ~ Intematioul Renewable energy and foreS'tly
FUDd
ITotalslavera~e - 103,310 3,970,171 - - -
2.1.1 Afforestation and Reforestation
Afforestation and reforestation both generally refer to the establishment of trees on non-treed
land. Reforestation refers to establishment of forest on land that recently had tree cover, whereas
29 Kauppi and Sedjo. 2001: 303.
30 Brown, Masera, and Sathaye. 2000: Section 5.2.2.
31 Moura-Costa and Stuart. 1998: Appendix.
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afforestation refers to land that has been without forest for much 10nger.32 For the purposes of accounting
under the Kyoto Protocol, however, these two mechanisms are the same. Afforestation and reforestation
are activities that are both fully expected to be creditable under the Kyoto Protocol. Article 3.3 of the
Protocol states, ''The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by sinks
resulting from direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation,
reforestation, and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment
period, shall be used to meet the commitments in this Article of each Party included in Annex I." At
COP-7, it was further specified that the eligibility of land-use, land-use change and forestry project
activities under Article 12 (the CDM) would be limited to afforestation and reforestation?3 It was also
agreed that afforestation and reforestation projects could be started and that projects already started could
generate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), which are the verified and authenticated units of
greenhouse gas reductions from abatement or sequestration projects certified by the Clean Development
Mechanism. These CERs would be creditable retroactively as from January 1,2000, provided they meet
the technical requirements that will be decided upon at COP-9 in 2003.34 In the meantime, however,
these requirements and many other clarifications, including the precise definition of reforestation, will not
be agreed upon until COP-9 in 2003.
2.1.2 Conservation
Conservation of existing forests for the purpose of carbon sequestration is one of the most
effective mechanisms by which emissions can be reduced because it both prevents the release of
emissions from deforestation and enables existing emissions to be absorbed. The largest (in terms of
area) forest carbon sequestration project initiated to date, the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action
Project in Bolivia, is a conservation project that protects 696,000 hectares from logging and deforestation
and is expected to reduce, avoid, and mitigate up to 7 million tons of carbon in the atmosphere over 30
years.35 Most environmental organizations are in support of including conservation in the Kyoto Protocol
because deforestation is a very real threat to biodiversity in many areas of the world. Healthy ecosystems
also help lower the poorest people's vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change. The mCN
(World Conservation Union) has stated, "Good conservation and management practices today may
therefore be the most cost-effective and practical way of dealing with the variations and changes in
climate in the future.,,36
32 Noble et al. 2000: Section 2.2.3.1.
33 UNFCCC COP-7. 2001: "Annex D: Article12," #13, #14, #15.
34 European Union website, "Climate Change: COP-7 Marrakech Final Report," November 10,2001.
35 The Nature Conservancy website, "Climate Action Project: Noel Kempff Mercado National Park, Bolivia."
36 IUCN (The World Conservation Union) website, "Climate Change & IUCN's Mission," 1999.
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Since the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, however, conservation has appeared less and less
likely to be a creditable activity under the land use, land use change, and forestry section of the Protocol's
mitigation agenda. It has been argued that the conservation of an existing forest does not help mitigate
climate change because there is no variation in the atmosphere's C02 concentration as a result of the
mere fact of conserving a forest and, supposedly, avoiding its deforestation. It is also difficult to prove
that the forest, if not deliberately conserved, would be deforested in the future. Conversely, it is hard to
ensure that the forest, once conserved, would not be at least partially deforested sometime after or even
during the project life. Moreover, even if the forest is conserved, it cannot be guaranteed that the areas
surrounding it would not be deforested. Also, without appropriate safeguards, credit could be issued for
"paper" reductions, whereby forests that are not truly at risk from deforestation are "set aside" for the
purpose of garnering emissions reductions credits.37
In addition, many developing countries, such as Brazil, are concerned that forest conservation
may not be as profitable as other land uses, such as plantations. Conservation also inherently denies a
landowner the right to transform his/her forestland into some other land use. Finally, if all existing
natural forests were eligible for conservation, then their inclusion as part of the Kyoto Protocol's
flexibility mechanisms would practically nullify the Protocol's emissions reduction requirements, as the
magnitude of possible sink activities would be at least twice greater than the reduction targets agreed in
Kyoto.38
With the publication of the IPCC's report entitled Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry in
2000, the door began to close on conservation as a mechanism by which Annex B countries could meet
their QELROs. At the November 2001 COP-7 meeting in Marrakech, a definitive decision was made to
exclude conservation from the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms by stating that while "the
implementation of land use, land-use change and forestry activities contributes to the conservation of
biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources," "the mere presence of carbon stocks [shall] be
excluded from accounting.,,39 This has shifted the focus of many new projects towards the other types of
forest carbon sequestration projects, primarily afforestation and reforestation.
2.1.3 Forest Management
Forest management includes activities such as forest regeneration, forest fertilization, fire
management, management of harvest quantity and timing, reduced forest degradation, and reduced impact
37WWF website, "Integrating Climate Change and Forest Conservation Policies: The WWF Perspective," June
1999.
38Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology website, "Brazilian Views on the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM)," 2002.
39UNFCCC COP-7. November 2001: Section K.
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logging.40 Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) is one form of forest management that has been demonstrated
in several ongoing projects. In comparison to RIL, conventional logging operations can significantly alter
a forest's physical structure. Removal of as little as 3% of the trees can reduce canopy cover by 50%. The
impact on undergrowth can also be significant in that the removal of just three trees per hectare can
destroy nearly 40% of the undergrowth. Shifting to RIL practices can reduce logging damage by as much
as 50% through pre-cutting vines, directional felling, and planned extraction of timber on properly
constructed and utilized skid trails. The NEES (New England Electric Systems) pilot project in Sabah,
Malaysia, completed in 1995, reduced logging damage by 50% and saved roughly 40 tons of carbon per
hectare (58,000 tons over the 1,400 hectare area) at a cost of $7.60/tC saved at two years after logging. In
addition, RIL practices help to retain wildlife habitat, lower fire risks, and reduce soil erosion. RIL can
also lead to better-stocked forest stands that are less damaged, faster growing, and produce greater
volumes and higher-value forest products in the future.41
While COP-7 established that Parties can claim emissions reductions from forest management
activities within Annex I countries in order to meet their QELROs for the first commitment period, the
decision to allow forest management as a creditable activity under the CDM in future commitment
periods will not be made until the negotiations on the second commitment period, which will take place in
2005.42 In addition, the official definition of creditable forest management activities will not be
determined until COP-9 in 2003.
2.2 Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects and Sustainable Development
Forest carbon sequestration projects contribute to sustainable development in many ways. Even
before the Kyoto Protocol's requirement that CDM projects contribute to the host country's sustainable
development goals, forest carbon sequestration projects were found to benefit both the local and national
economic and environmental development priorities of their host countries. In regard to economics,
forest carbon sequestration projects can provide local revenue from project investment and returns,
generate employment, diversify farm economies, enhance firewood security, and increase timber
production. Besides sequestering carbon, carbon sequestration projects benefit the environment by
protecting or enhancing biodiversity, increasing wildlife habitat and soil fertility, reducing soil erosion,
and protecting watersheds. Increased forest cover also helps prevent flooding, and the growth of forest
plantations or community woodlots helps to reduce the pressure to log in natural forests.
40 Lim, Farquhar, and Ravindranath. 2000: Section 6.3.2.1.
41 Totten. 1999: 27.
42 UNFCCC COP-7. November 2001: "Annex C-Article 3.4," #6.
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2.2.1 Forest Carbon Sequestration and Deforestation
The environmental benefits of forest carbon sequestration, especially biodiversity, are particularly
important when put into the context of deforestation and species loss in the tropics. Tropical Latin
America is one of the most biodiverse places on earth. It is also one of the areas most threatened by
deforestation. While rates of deforestation have declined slightly in the last decade in some tropical
countries, the average net loss of forest carbon stocks has continued.43
Latin America accounts for 51% of the global area of tropical forests, the ecosystem that contains
the highest stock of carbon. Mature tropical humid forests represent the largest stock of terrestrial carbon
in the tropics, with a mean carbon content of around 150 tC/hectare and a range of up to 800 tC/hectare
(including root and soil carbon) for the cloud forests of southern Mexico.44
Figure 7 - Estimates of Global Carbon Stocks in Vegetation and Soils to 1m Depth45
Area Carhon Stol'ks (Gt C)
Biome (l06 kill!) \'('gcltllioll Soils liJIa/
TIOpical forests 17.6 212 216 -t2X
Temperate forests 10.4 54 100 159
Boreal forests 13.7 XX -171 559
Tropical sav:mnas 225 6(, 264 330
Temperate grasslands 125 () 295 304
Deserts and semidcserts 45.5 8 191 199
TundrJ 95 (; 121 127
Wetlands 35 15 225 2.lO
Croplands 16.0 .l 128 131
Total 151.2 -1M 2011 2477
The conversion of this ecosystem to arable land typically results in a large reduction of biomass
and a loss of about 30% of the carbon in the first meter of soil (about 40% in tropical soils).46 In the
tropics, the associated C02 emissions from forest conversion to pastures or agriculture were estimated to
be 1.6 +/- 1.0 GtC/year between 1980 and 1989.47 In temperate zones, where there is little expansion of
agricultural lands now, losses of carbon stocks have largely abated. In tropical zones, however, the
release of C02 to the atmosphere remains an important problem because of the widespread clearing of
new land and the reduced duration of fallow periods in shifting cultivation.48 According to the UN FAD,
about 15.4 million hectares of natural tropical forest are lost each year. Of this, 42% occurs in Latin
America, 31% in Africa, and 27% in Asia.49
43 Kauppi and Sedjo. 2001: 303.
44 Bass, Dubois, Moura-Costa, Pinard, Tipper, and Wilson. 2000: 25.
45 IPCC. "Summary for Policymakers," Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry, 2000: Part 1.
46Kauppi and Sedjo. 2001: 306.
47Bass, Dubois, Moura-Costa, Pinard, Tipper, and Wilson. March 2000: 23.
48Kauppi, and Sedjo. 2001: 306.
49 Kauppi, and Sedjo. 2001: 306.
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Figure 8 - Estimated forest cover and deforestation rates at regional and global levels based on
1990 and 1995 satellite data50
The potential for land management strategies as a way to conserve existing carbon sinks is clearly
illustrated by global deforestation rates. In 1990, global forest cover was estimated at 3,510 million
hectares.51 Global deforestation rates were estimated at between 13.9 million and 20.4 million
hectares/year during the 1980s and early 1990s,52but have now been found to be much higher, since in
1999 forest resources stood at 3,221 million hectares. This amounts to an average deforestation rate of
around 32 million hectares/year.53
2.2.2 Forest Carbon Sequestration and Biodiversity
Biological diversity is being eroded as fast today as at any time since the dinosaurs died out some
65 million years ago, and most of this extinction is taking place in tropical forests. Of the estimated 10
million species that live on earth, tropical forests house between 50 and 90% of them. About 17 million
hectares of tropical forests - an area four times the size of Switzerland - are now being cleared annually,
and scientists estimate that at these rates roughly 5 to 10% of tropical forest species may face extinction
50 Bass, Dubois, Moura-Costa, Pinard, Tipper, and Wilson. March 2000: 24.
51Bass, Dubois, Moura-Costa, Pinard, Tipper, and Wilson. March 2000: 23.
52Bass, Dubois, Moura-Costa, Pinard, Tipper, and Wilson. March 2000: 23.
53Bass, Dubois, Moura-Costa, Pinard, Tipper, and Wilson, March 2000: 26.
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within the next 30 years.54 Already, half the world's tropical forests have been cleared or degraded.
Every hour, at least 1,800 hectares are cut down, and another four plant or animal species die out, most of
them in the tropics.55
In addition, climate change is predicted to severely accelerate the rate of species loss. The
Hadley Center for Climate Change at the United Kingdom Meteorological Office has predicted that, by
2050, the earth's forests will become a significant net source of CO2 emissions when huge blocks of
remaining forests, such as the northern Amazon, succumb to changing climate and die back, becoming
grassland, steppe, or desert. 56 Forest carbon sequestration is therefore not only important as a way to
offset GHG emissions from anthropogenic sources, it is necessary to offset the forces that threaten the
forest itself.
54 WRI website, "Losses of Biodiversity and Their Causes."
55 Miller and Tangley. 1991: Introduction.
56 WWF website. "Integrating Climate Change and Forest Conservation Policies: The WWF Perspective," June
1999.
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Chapter 3 - Case Studies: Forest Carbon Sequestration in Latin America
To better understand how forest carbon sequestration can be used to mitigate climate change, I
investigate three projects that cover the range of forest carbon sequestration project types in three
different Latin American countries. Ichose projects in Latin America not simply because that is where
most of the forest carbon sequestration projects have taken place, but because of the potential and the
need that exists for these kinds of projects there. Specifically, while Latin America contains the bulk of
the world's remaining tropical forests, it also has the world's fastest rate of deforestation.
The case studies Ichose include the Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project, which
involves conservation and forest management in Belize; the Klinki Forestry Project, which involves
reforestation in Costa Rica; and the FACE/Profafor Forestry Project, which involves afforestation in
Ecuador. While these case studies are by no means typical of forest carbon sequestration projects in
general, they illustrate the multi-stakeholder relationships characteristic of these kinds of projects and
give insight into project design, locational specificities, and the benefits that provide the incentives to
undertake them.
3.1 Belize - the Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project
3.1.1 Country Overview
Belize, slightly smaller than Massachusetts at 22,966 square kilometers, is Central America's
most forested and least populated country. Approximately 79% of the country is comprised of forest and
other wooded areas, 65.1% of which is tropical broadleaf forest.57 The rest of Belize's total land area is
made up of arable land (10%), permanent cropland (1%), permanent pasture (2%), and other land uses
(3%).58 Approximately 38.5% of Belize's total land area is protected in public or private parks and
reserves,59 which is made possible in part because of the country's low population of only 256,062
people.60
Belize's small, essentially private enterprise economy is based primarily on agriculture, food
processing, and merchandising, with tourism and construction assuming greater importance. Sugar, the
chief crop, accounts for nearly half of exports, while the banana industry is the country's largest employer.
The government's austerity program in 1997 resulted in an economic slowdown that continued in 1998.
57Belize Central Statistical Office. "Table 18b-Forest Classes, Areas, and Percentages for Belize Mainland - 1994,"
April 1999: 18.
58CIA World Factbook 2001, "Belize-Land Use (2000 est.)." Note: this source puts the percentage of Belize's land
under forest and woodland at 84%.
59Belize Central Statistical Office. "Table 26a-Declared Protected Areas of Belize (up to 1998)," April 1999: 26.
60 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Belize-Population (July 2001 est.)."
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The trade deficit has been growing, mostly as a result of low export prices for sugar and bananas. The
tourist and construction sectors strengthened in early 1999, supporting growth of 6% in 1999 and 4% in
2000.61 Tourism is now Belize's single largest income generator, with ecotourism being Belize's primary
niche market. 62
Aided by international donors, the government's key short-term objective remains the reduction
of poverty, since 33% of its people live below the poverty line.63 The country remains plagued by a
12.8% unemployment rate,64growing involvement in the South American drug trade, and increased urban
crime.65 While logging is still a major earner of foreign exchange in Belize,66 declines in productivity
resulting from the depletion of Belize's two main timber species, mahogany and pine, has quickened the
pace of conversion from forest to farmland.67 Currently, large-scale, permanent agriculture has taken over
from logging as the primary cause of deforestation in Belize.68
3.1.2 Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project (RBCSPP)
The Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project in Belize, started in 1995, was one of the first
fully funded forest sector projects implemented under the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI).
USIJI, which was started in 1994, is a government program that has provided a framework for developing
and implementing climate change mitigation projects. It facilitates linkages between project developers,
investors, technical experts, and project host countries. The RBCSPP is a result of one of these linkages,
in this case between The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Programme for Belize (PFB), Winrock
International, the Government of Belize, and a number of electric utility and energy company investors,
including Cinergy, Detroit Edison, Nexen, PacifiCorp, Suncor, Wisconsin Electric Power Company
(WEPCO), and the Utilitree Carbon Company, which is a non-profit corporation established by the
electric utility industry to invest in forest carbon sequestration projects. Through the protection of land
from deforestation and the implementation of sustainable forest management practices, the RBCSPP is
expected to reduce, avoid or mitigate an estimated 2.4 million tons of carbon during its 40-year lifetime.69
61CIA World Factbook 2001, "Belize-Overview."
62 Fuller, Carlos. Interview January 29, 2002.
63 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Belize-Population Below the Poverty Line (1999 est.)"
64 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Belize-Unemployment Rate (1999)"
65CIA World Factbook 2001, "Belize-Overview"
66 Belize Central Statistical Office. "Forests," April 1999: 18-19
67Brandon, Redford, and Sanderson. 1998: 242.
68 Platt, Elizabeth. 1998: 128-129.
69 The Nature Conservancy website, "Climate Action Project Rio Bravo Conservation and Management Area,
Belize."
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3.1.3 Rio Bravo Conservation and
Management Area (RBCMA)
Located in Belize's northwest
comer near the border of Mexico and
Guatemala, the Rio Bravo Conservation
and Management Area, at 4.6% of
Belize's total land area, is the country's
largest private reserve and second
largest single protected area.70 Owned
and managed by PFB, this 104,892-
hectare parcel is part of a million-acre
forest corridor that is vital to
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Fi2ure 9 - Rio Bravo Conservation Mana2ement Area
biodiversity conservation in Central
America. The RBCMA supports a
valuable assemblage of biodiversity
that includes 392 species of birds, 200
species of trees, 70 species of
mammals, and 12 endangered animal species, including the black howler monkey and the jaguar.71
Besides containing forest cover types protected nowhere else in Belize, the RBCMA also protects one of
Belize's richest remaining stocks of mahogany.
PFB holds title to the RBCMA in a contract with the Government of Belize to manage the area
for the people of Belize in perpetuity. PFB established the RBCMA in 1988 through the purchase and
donation of several private landholdings made possible by the activism of Belizean and international
conservationists, and by the Belizean government's favorable attitude towards conservation NGOs.72
3.1.4 Project Design
As reported by the USIJI, the objective of the RBCSPP is to demonstrate an optimal balance
between cost-effective carbon sequestration, economically sustainable forest yield, and environmental
protection. To accomplish this, the project uses two main strategies to sequester carbon: conservation
through the acquisition of land threatened by deforestation and sustainable forest management of existing
protected forestland.
70 The Nature Conservancy website, "Belize Program."
71 Programme for Belize website.
72 Brandon, Redford, and Sanderson. 1998: 218-219.
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Component A of the project involved the purchase of a 5,602 hectare parcel of forestland, 5,504
hectares of which would have been converted to farmland in five years time if not for intervention by the
project. Carbon offsets from this purchase were calculated by subtracting the total estimated carbon stock
of the Component A land that would have been deforested (1,568,907 tC) by the total estimated carbon
stock of a reference case (here, a nearby field of local crops at 467,815 tC) to arrive at a figure for total
emissions avoided of 1,101,093 tC.73
Component B of the project seeks to increase the level and rate of carbon sequestration on a
44,383-hectare parcel of existing RBCMA land through the establishment and implementation of an
economically sustainable forest management program. The primary activities of this program include
sustainable reduced-impact logging, pine stocking enhancement, and fire protection.74
Carbon sequestration benefits from Component B are calculated by determining the average
annual biomass accumulation rate, the impacts of sustainable harvesting and low-impact logging
approaches, and fire protection practices. Over the project's lifetime, the estimated carbon stock for all of
Component B is expected to grow from 4,199,218 tC in 1995 to 4,741,032 tC in 2035, for a net gain of
541,814 tC.75
A second phase of the RBCSPP was initiated in 1997, when PFB purchased an adjacent 7,707
hectare parcel, 4,587 hectares of which would have been deforested and converted to farmland. The total
estimated emissions avoided by this purchase totaled 978,407 tC. This parcel will be added to
Component B, where it is expected to sequester an additional 3,904 tC/yr for a total of 156,160 tC over
the project's 40-year lifetime.76
The remaining RBCMA lands have been left undisturbed for conservation and research purposes,
and are managed as protected forest. These lands are also used for ecotourism and the protection of
Mayan ruins located in the area.
3.1.5 Project Stakeholders
The funding for the project, totaling more than $5.6 million over a ten-year investment period,
was spread out among the electricity utilities and energy company investors and PFB. In the first phase,
WEPCO put in over $1 million for project development, and later invested an additional $520,000 for
project implementation, which was matched by Cinergy, Detroit Edison, Pacificorp, and Utilitree.
Programme for Belize contributed over $1.2 million towards the project as a whole, and Suncor has added
over $400,000. In 2000, Nexen, Suncor, WEPCO, and PFB shared the cost of the second phase of the
73 USIJI - Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 16-21.
74 USIJI - Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 11.
75 USIJI - Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 16-21.
76 USIJI - Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 21.
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project, which was about $2 million for the purchase of the 7,707-hectare parcel, and $1 million for
project management.77 Through the establishment of an endowment fund, the project is expected to
continue its activities beyond the 10-year investment period and on through its 40-year lifetime.
3.1.6 Project Benefits
The benefits of the RBCSPP extend to its stakeholders in a variety of ways. All of the finance
providers of the project hold an equal share in the carbon offsets that are generated.78 However, at the
time of the first phase investment in 1995, it was unclear whether conservation and forest management
would be creditable under the climate change regime. At COP-7 in 2001, it was decided that
conservation would not be creditable under the first commitment period, and that forest management
would also not be creditable for joint implementation projects between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1
countries. There is still some hope that this project might be creditable under the second commitment
period or under some kind of emissions trading system set up by the US, but the probability of this is
unknown.
Despite the lack of guaranteed credits, the project has generally been considered a success,
because as a pilot project, all stakeholders have learned and benefited from the process of establishing the
project. TNC and PFB have learned about the management of carbon sequestration projects, Winrock has
gained experience in establishing carbon sequestration monitoring protocols, and the government of
Belize has been able to show that Belize is a friendly and cooperative place in which to invest in carbon
sequestration projects.
In addition, the project has contributed to local scientific and managerial capacity, provided jobs
and training in forestry, forest management, and park security, contributed to environmental and
economic outreach programs, and improved roads and other infrastructure. The project has also helped
with a number of scientific studies, including research on the feasibility of sustainable logging and
mahogany regeneration. In terms of forest resources and habitat conservation, it has ensured the
conservation of over 13,300 more hectares in the biologically significant Maya forest corridor, increased
protection of the RBCMA as a whole, and improved forest resource management.
3.2 Costa Rica - the Klinki Forestry Project
3.2.1 Country Overview
Costa Rica is the most successful Central American country in terms of political and economic
stability. Although still a largely agricultural country, it has achieved a relatively high standard of living.
77 USI1I - Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 12.
78 USIJI - Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 34.
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A small country of 51,100 sq km (slightly smaller than West Virginia), Costa Rica has a population of
3,773,057.79 The percentage of its population under the poverty line has been substantially reduced over
the past 15 years to 20.6%, and a strong social safety net has been put into place.so Costa Rica's basically
stable economy depends on tourism, agriculture, and electronics exports. Foreign investors remain
attracted by the country's political stability and high education levels, and tourism has been rapidly
expanding. However, traditional export sectors have not kept pace. Low coffee prices and a glut of
bananas have hurt the agricultural sector. Also, the government continues to grapple with its large deficit
and massive internal debt.
Since the early 1990s, Costa Rica has been implementing its vision for sustainable development.
The two sectors on which Costa Rica is basing its plans are tourism and energy. The country produces
83.32% of its electricity from hydropower, and is a net exporter of energy, with 165 million kWh
exported in 1999.81 Also, from 1987 to 1995, the number of tourists visiting the country grew at an
average annual rate of 15%, which was much better than the world average, due in part to Costa Rica's
positioning in the ecotourism market. S2
The only way a vision based on these two sectors is possible is if the processes of environmental
degradation in the country, e.g., deforestation and watershed deterioration, are controlled. Stopping and
reversing these processes is critical for the development of these two vital sectors, both of which depend
on the presence of forests. This logic has pushed Costa Rica to make strong decisions on the use of its
natural resources, particularly its forested areas. During the 1960s and 1970s, Costa Rica had one of the
world's highest deforestation rates, with thousands of hectares of forest lost to cattle ranching and large-
scale agriculture.83 As an example of the extent of deforestation, between 1961 and 1989, the area of
pastureland in Costa Rica more than doubled, while the area covered by forest fell by more than 50%.84
While the deforestation rate has since declined due to changes in land use policy (and in part because
most of the land suitable for cattle and agriculture has already been cleared), and now that 24% of Costa
Rica's national territory has been designated as national parks or protected areas, the present challenge is
the protection of existing forests and the revitalization of degraded lands.
3.2.2 K1inki Forestry Project
In terms of forest resources, only 31% of Costa Rica is covered in forest and woodland, as
deforestation from cattle ranching, agriculture, logging, and development has steadily eroded the
79 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Costa Rica-Population (July 2001 est.)"
80 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Costa Rica-Population below Poverty Line (1999 est.)"
81 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Costa Rica-Electricity (1999)"
82 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 4.
83 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 5.
84 Menkhaus and Lober. 1996: 1-10.
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country's forest base. 1993 estimates put 46% of the country's land under permanent pasture, 6% as
arable land, 5% as permanent cropland, and 12% under other land uses.85
The Klinki Forestry Project, which began in 1997, is a USIJI-approved project that seeks to
reforest pastures and marginal cropland with a native and naturalized tree mixture that includes the Klinki
pine, a fast-growing non-native tree species that is suitable for use as utility poles and lumber. The
project takes place on individual and collective farms in the Turrialba Valley of Costa Rica's Atlantic
zone and to the north towards San Carlos.86
The objective of the project is to involve farmers in carbon sequestration as an economic activity
by using the latest silvicultural technology to provide wood production and GHG mitigation benefits.
The forests that are planted are designed to meet the two goals of carbon sequestration and timber
production. The mixture of tree species, called the Klinki Matrix, was developed for this purpose over
more than 40 years of research and development in Costa Rica. The Matrix includes three distinct tree
types:
• super-fast-growing trees at wide spacing growing over the main stand
• a main stand of very-fast-growing species
• moderate-growing and very long-lived shade tolerant species
This tree mixture produces a layered canopy in which the super-fast-growing trees (mainly the
Klinki pine) can grow up to 15 feet in height per year, while the moderately-fast growing trees grow up to
5 feet per year, depending on site quality. The first thinning of this type of forest can be expected to take
place between 10 and 15 years after planting, thus enabling the farmer to earn income during the project's
25-year lifetime. While the super-fast-growing trees provide early yields, the very-fast-growing species
carry out the early sequestration of carbon and income for the farmer, and the long-Iivedlmoderate-
growing trees provide the bulk of the carbon sequestration and the long-term carbon storage beyond the
end of the contract. 87
3.2.3 Project Stakeholders
As of April 2002, 46.5 hectares of Klinki Matrix forest have been planted on five farms in Costa
Rica to offset the C02 emissions of 37 US emitters, and an additional planting of 40.5 hectares has been
funded for establishment in May 2002.88 While the project hoped to plant 6,000 hectares, it has only
received enough funding to sequester a fraction of that amount. This is in part due to the intent and the
design of the project. While the project involves reforestation, which is a creditable activity, the project
85 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Costa Rica-Land Use (1993 est.)"
86 USIJI - Klinki Forestry Project." September 1999: 1.
87Reforest the Tropics website, "About the Forests."
88 Reforest the Tropics website, "About Reforest the Tropics, Inc."
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was created to demonstrate the involvement of farmers in carbon sequestration as an economic activity
while providing GHG, wood production, and conservation benefits. The carbon offsets that are generated
are only valid for the buyer's personal use and are not tradable in any market because they receive no
third-party verification, which would raise the project's operating costs considerably. Under the Kyoto
Protocol, projects need to be independently verified in order to be creditable.
The stakeholders involved in this project include Reforest the Tropics (RTT), individual and
collective groups of farmers, and a number of technical assistance providers, including the Cantonal
Agricultural Center of Turrialba (CACTU), the US Department of Agriculture Forest Products Laboratory,
the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, and the Tropical Agriculture Research and
Higher Education Center (CATIE). The benefactors of Reforest the Tropics are a diverse collection of
small businesses, institutions, and individuals, most of whom have in some way have a personal
connection to Dr. Herster Barres, RTT's founder. They include Connecticut College, the Mohegan Tribe
of Indians of Connecticut, Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative, Superior Nut Company,
St. Mark's Church of New Canaan, several Connecticut elementary, middle, and high schools, and a
number of private individuals. Lastly, the Costa Rican government is involved through its Office on Joint
Implementation (OCIC). OCIC is the national entity that promotes investment, provides project
guidelines, evaluates and follows up on All projects, makes reports to the Secretariat of the FCCC, and
represents the Costa Rican government in the climate negotiations within the FCCC and other multilateral
and bilateral organizations. RTT has an agreement with OCIC to conduct jointly implemented
reforestation activities in Costa Rica.
33
Figure 10 - Benefactors and respective areas planted under Klinki Project89
LIST OF OONORS WITH CAROON SEQUESTRATION FORESTS
HetOfe~.t n:e 'TrO(;,cs.
260.;t 01
Sponsor
A 2Gdo"or P,eiect
1 Hartman, John & Keily
:z Pmine, Hugh
3 Hint!ian. Harry
4 Andersen, DJVl,j
5 Cutler Middle School
6 Banes, ~.kanda
Fou:kes. Den
8 GelJalle, Gordon (Yale)
9 Slrlckler, William B
10 The Home Depot
11 Ayer, Frank 8. Harriet
12 lyon. Tom
13 Wood'and Dr Apts
see 5 Culler Middle School
14 St 'hik's Church
lS ROlaryClub 01t:':/ewlom:lon, CT
16 Homer Wn9111
17 Rotary Club 01Esse(, C r
18 Rotary Cluh of Mystic. c:T."
19 ROlaryClub 01Norwich. CT
20 'Rotary Club 01Slon,ngton,Cr
21 Mr. & Mrs, Graves, Norwich. CT
:n Rotaryblli)of Madison, CT
2:1 'Rev. Hers:er Barres
24 .Rotary Club of Groton-Ledyard
25 'Stonington, ,.I.E:~lelTiel'1tarySchool
26 .J Winttlrcp High School
:Addilional planledbythe farmers
Year
Tvpe funded Donation Area. acres
Foundation iil98 $ 400 100
Relired 1998 S 400 1.00
Businessmall 1998 $ 400 100
f;~~leglslatorffOI11 CT 19913 $ 525 1.31
Middle school 1998 $ 437 '109
Houscwife 1998 $ 400 1.00
Retired aircraft engineer 1998 $ .lob' 100
Ass!. Dean Yale Forestry 1998 S 800 2.00
Patent lawyer 1998 S 400 i.oo
el1sines$ 1998 S 400 1.00
"Retlred 1998 s 525 131
Retired '-'998 S 400 -100
81lSIness 1998 S 400 1.00 16
MIddle School 1998 S 304 0.76 12
Cl1urdl 1998 's 580 1.45 23
Social organization 1998 S 831 100 16
Advertising e(eCut've 1998 S 400 1.00 16
.Sodal organization 1998 S 300 0.52 8
Social OI'ganlz.'lt!()I'1'_'__ 1998 S 165 0.29 5
Social organization 1998 S 180' 031 5
Soci'll organizali()n 1998 S 120 0.21 3
Individual 1998 S 100 0.17 3
.Social OfIJonl:Z(ltl0I'1.. "1996 S 160 0.19 3
MinIster 1998 S 100 012 2
.SOCIal organization, 1998 S 160 0.19 3
,ElelTientary school 1998 S ...... 400 100" 16
High School 1998 S 573' 1.00 lif
1998 300 48
. Tolal;ortfle 26cmilterl donorS 10,260 25~? 415
400
400
524
436
400
400
800
400
400
.. 524
400
400
304
58D
400
400
208
116
124
84
68
76
48
/6
400
400
1,200
10,:168
lijioo
5.940
14.832
988
400
400
986
400
400
'190
968
40,000
464
238.
593 -
40......._ .....'1'6.-
16
40
i6
16
8'
40
1.600.'"
29.00
14.85
3708
2.47
1.CO
'100
2.47
1.001.06 ...---.------ ..- -
0,48
247
100,99 ,_
1998 . S 25.876"
. 1999 $' 12.000'
1999 S 36.252
1999 S 2.053.
-'1999-'-' S 631
1999 S 650
1999 . S 2,053
1999 ' 5--'691
--"9'19 . S 631
1999 S 395 [
2001 S 2.053 .
20015 120.100 i
Business
Building and fleet 01cars
Crozier-Williams Center
School teactJer
School
IndIVIdual
.Doctor and wile
'chura)""
Business
Church
Married coupte
. Off Selling fuel ce» elTijssi!,~~...
27 Superior Nut Co .ci:li,,:iridge.MA
28 Connecticut Muniopa\ Electnc E.nergyCooperati'le (CMEEC)
29 Connecticut Collcge
30ZOf1e~ project. Karen Valente
31 Zonex Project. Klinkl Academy
32 Zonex Project. Morton, John
33 lonex Project, Ann~Anis Racy
34 "Z0I'l~xProject. 51.Mark's Church
35 Zonex ProJect. The Home Depot
36 Zonex Project. Unrtanan Church, Rutl<1ndVT
37 Kathleen & Michael Schiano. Weatoquf: CT
38 )he '.1ohegan Tnbe, UncasvillE.C.!'.(piant,nlj in May'(2)
:Qra"dtotal for all Projects Grand total S 214.446 3,500 . 87,494
3.2.4 Project Design
The project is designed to take place in four stages. First, RTT helps its benefactors determine
how much C02 they emit, and thus how much they should offset. They then arrange the funding for the
amount of forest to be planted to make up this offset through carbon sequestration. Second, RTT locates
a farmer in Costa Rica who is willing to convert his pastures or marginal cropland into forest. Third, RTT
organizes a link between the benefactor and the farmer through a 25-year legal contract that gives cash
grants, seedlings, and technical assistance to the farmer through RTT along with the promise of periodic
monitoring and reports. The farmer remains the owner of the land, the forest, and all of the forest's
products, except for the credit for the carbon sequestered, which is given to RTT in the name of the
benefactor. The farmer is allowed to thin his forest as it grows, leaving behind an adequate stock of trees
containing an agreed-upon amount of sequestered carbon. This legal contract is made possible through
the US and Costa Rica's approval of the project. Beyond the funding of the project, the benefactor has no
89 RTf website.
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other legal commitments. Fourth, RTT's Costa Rican counterparts within CACTU who are responsible
for the forest's long-term management, ASOFORES (Asociacion para el Desarollo Forestal or
Association for the Development of Forestry), monitor and report on the amount of sequestration that
actually occurs.90
3.2.5 Project Benefits
In general, benefactors to the project pay $2,500 to plant and maintain 1 hectare of forest for 25
years, which is expected to sequester an average of 8.2 tC/year.91•92 This works out to a price of
approximately $12.20/tC/year. Farmers receive $1,000 per hectare over a 3-year period, plus seedlings
and technical assistance on siting, planting, and forest management. 93 Since pastureland net income per
hectare is low (only about $50/hectare/year to raise beef cattle), and the farmers chosen do not require
cash income on all their lands every year, the Klinki project works out to be a sound land use option for
them.94 This is especially true when trees are planted on hilly, degraded land. Besides generating short-
term income and future cash flow from the sale of some of the trees, the project helps stabilize and enrich
the soil, improve water habitats and stream flow, reduce the use of chemicals as low-yield crops are
shifted to forest plantations, increase biodiversity by nurturing a new understory with native species, and
reduce energy use by substituting concrete with Klinki pine plywood.95 The project also reduces pressure
to log on natural forest, provides more affordable housing through local, lower-priced construction
materials, and creates a more diversified farm economy.96 While the scale of the project is small at this
point, the principles of the project are in line with Costa Rica's sustainable development goals of
protecting its watersheds and tourism resources.
3.3 Ecuador - the FACElProfafor Forestry Project
3.3.1 Country Overview
Ecuador, at 283,560 sq km (slightly smaller than Nevada) is a resource-rich but troubled country.
50% of its 13,183,978 people live below the poverty line despite its substantial oil reserves and rich
agricultural areas, as most of its land and resources are held by the country's elites.97 Ecuador's economy,
based on the export of primary products such as oil, bananas, and shrimp, is vulnerable to fluctuations in
90 Reforest the Tropics, Letter to Potential Benefactor explaining RTT's mission, March 13,2002.
91 Reforest the Tropics brochure, 2001.
92 USIJI - Klinki Forestry Project. September 1999: 13.
93 Barres, Herster. Interview March 14,2002.
94 Rojas, Carlos Manuel. Interview March 20, 2002.
95 USIJI - Klinki Forestry Project. September 1999: 11.
96 USIJI - Klinki Forestry Project. September 1999: 11.
97 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Ecuador-Population (July 2001 est.), Population below the Poverty Line (1999 est.)"
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world market prices, and has been growing unevenly due to ill-conceived fiscal stabilization measures.
While Ecuador joined the World Trade Organization in 1996, it has failed to comply with many of its
accession commitments. The aftermath of EI Nino and the depressed oil market of 1997-98 caused
Ecuador's economy to plunge in 1999. The beginning of 1999 also saw the banking sector collapse, which
helped precipitate an unprecedented default on external loans later that year. Throughout 1999, continued
economic instability drove a 70% depreciation of the currency, which eventually forced the government
to "dollarize" the currency regime in 2000.98 The move stabilized the currency, but the government was
forced to changed hands, an event that has taken place on an average of every two years since
independence in 1822.99
Ecuador's political, economic, and social instability are the greatest threats to the sustainability of
its natural resources. In the tropical Andes of northwest Ecuador, if deforestation rates remain at current
levels, forests in the region will disappear completely within 30-35 years.loo This would constitute one of
the most serious losses to the world's biodiversity, as the tropical Andes contains the highest number of
unique plant and animal species found anyplace on earth. 101 While 56% of Ecuador remains as forest and
woodland, this number continues to decline. Other land uses in Ecuador are permanent pasture (18%),
arable land (60/0), permanent cropland (5%), and other land uses (15%).102
Figure 11- FACE/Profafor Project Areas 103
3.3.2 F CElProfafor Forestry Project
The FACE/Profaror project in Ecuador was
established in 1993 for the purpose of afforestation,
primarily on the montane grasslands of the Andes
where the original forests have almost completely
disappeared. The land is being afforested using a
mixture of non-native (mostly pine and eucalyptus) and
native tree species via collaboration between FACE,
Profafor, and individual and collective groups of
farmers and indigenous communities. SGS is
responsible for verifying and certifying the carbon
sequestered by this project, which originated from an
98 CIA World Factbook 2001, "Ecuador-Economy"
99 Sacco, Christoher. "A Brief Hi tory of Ecuador," EcuadorExplorer.com website.
100 Sierra and StalJings. 1998: 135.
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103 Profafor Manual de Contratos: 5.
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agreement signed in 1993 between FACE and the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment to plant 5,000
hectares of new forest per year for a total of 75,000 hectares. As of January 2001, over 25,200 hectares
have been put under contract and are being planted.
3.3.3 Project Stakeholders
The FACE Foundation was established in 1990 by NV SEP, the Dutch Electricity Generating
Board, which was a consortium of four Dutch electricity companies. The purpose of the FACE was to
establish a portfolio of forestry projects around the world to accrue carbon offsets equivalent to the
emissions from new fossil-fuel power plants in the Netherlands. 104 FACE invests in the capacity of the
forest to absorb C02; all the other benefits of the forest are for the landowner, and FACE does not buy
land. FACE currently has projects in five countries: the Netherlands, Malaysia, Uganda, the Czech
Republic, and Ecuador. In 2000, FACE formally ended its relationship with NY SEP and became an
independent non-profit. However, its largest client is still BV NEA, the legal successor to NY SEP.
Funding from past orders by NV SEP has been paid by BV NEA, which enables FACE to keep its
projects and office running until the end of 2003.105
To generate revenue, FACE has the rights to sell the C02 sequestered by the forests planted
under NY SEP. This revenue is then invested in the development of more projects to plant and manage
sustainable forests.I06 Since its independence, FACE has sought new investors for which it initiates and
manages forest carbon sequestration projects. Its plan is to sells SGS-certified Verified Emission
Reductions (VERs)107to clients wishing to offset their GHG emissions from its existing forests through
its commercial outlet, Business for Climate, which is a partnership between FACE and Triodos Bank, a
socially-responsible lender in Europe. Some of their current and prospective investors include the
Museon in The Hague, the government of Utrecht province, Autoclick (a European car sales and
information website), Between-us (a media marketing consultancy), Polyprint (a professional printing
company), Peeze (a coffee company), and VBDO (the Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable
Development).
The Museon in The Hague, by deciding to have 644 tons of C02 sequestered in forest on its
behalf every year, has become the first climate-neutral museum in the world, meaning that it has offset
the GHGs emitted from its operation in order to achieve a net-zero impact on the earth's climate. The
growing interest in climate-neutrality has increased FACE's efforts to develop the idea further in terms of
104 Totten. 1999: 10.
105 FACE Annual Report 2000: 17.
106 FACE Annual Report 2000: 17.
107 VERs are created, in the absence of government rules, by project-based activities that are defined by the buyer
and seller and verified by an independent third party. They have the possibility, but not the guarantee, to be
creditable by governments as CERs under the CDM and used to meet future emissions reductions requirements.
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marketing.108 Also, pressure from the Dutch government to reduce GHG emissions will likely increase
the demand for FACE's products and services. In contrast to the Dutch government's original
commitment to reduce C02 emissions by 3% from 1990 to 2000, the country's emissions have risen by
17% over the same period, which makes the Dutch government's Kyoto target of a 6% reduction from
1990 levels by 2008-12 seem highly unlikely, even when the possibility of emissions trading is taken into
account. 109
3.3.4 Project Design
Profafor, which manages FACE's project in Ecuador, was started in 1993 by FACE and is
responsible for the coordination of project activities. Its office in Quito assesses applications,
communicates with the Ministry of Environment and landowners, supervises tree planting, and deals with
project administration. It negotiates the contracts with the project's main beneficiaries: individual
landowners, institutional landowners, cooperatives, and indigenous communities. For these landowners,
project sites are 50 hectares minimum, 600 hectares maximum for indigenous communities, and 300
hectares maximum for other landowners. I 10 Profafor also allows large private landowners to be eligible
for projects if they meet the criteria and contract requirements that FACE stipulates in its large overseas
projects. The forests in these contracts must be composed primarily of original native species and have a
long rotational period, and a minimum of 1,000 hectares must be planted annually in the first three
years.111
In its contracts, Profafor pays landowners $97-$367 per hectare depending on location
(mountains or coast) and species (non-native, native, or a mixture of both) and supplies them with
seedlings to plant and maintain as forest for a 99-year period. Payments are made in several phases, with
the final installment paid at the end of planting after roughly three years. Monitoring of the project
continues regularly during the following years, as does external verification by SGS. If trees are lost after
the first three years of the project, the landowner is required to replant at their own cost. It is assumed
that after 20 years, some of the trees will be cut and replanted. I 12 The landowner is required to reserve
30% of the harvest revenue for the costs of replanting and in this way retain the forest's capacity to
absorb CO2 for 99 years. I 13
Before contracts are made, FACElProfafor requires that the areas be ecologically sustainable,
economically viable, accepted by the community, have secure land tenure, and have no existing forest on
108 FACE Annual Report 2000: 8.
109 Gummer and Moreland. June 2000: 33.
110 FACE/Profafor. "Manual de Contratos," 2002: 8.
III FACE website, "Projects: Latin America: Ecuador."
112 FACE website, "Projects: Latin America: Ecuador."
113 CIFOR. 2001: 6.
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the proposed site. Also, technical feasibility studies and site inspections must be conducted and approved
by the project. In addition, according to the technical regulations, each contract must also have a
forestation plan and management plan.114 These requirements are crucial to the project's success.
As of November 2000, there were 151 Profafor contracts located over ten provinces in the
Andean region that have established over 23,000 hectares of new forest. I 15 Profafor also has seven
contracts in the northwest coastal provinces of Esmereldas and Manabi for 500-600 hectares of forest, but
these contracts are now on hold while more studies are done to better determine the project baseline and
to investigate land titIes.1l6
3.3.5 Project Benefits
The benefits from the Profafor/F ACE projects in Ecuador are numerous. For landowners with
limited access to credit and degraded pasture or farmland, the project provides a source of short-and long-
term capital, generates local employment, contributes to public infrastructure, and diversifies the area's
economy while stabilizing and enriching the soil. The project also increases access to firewood (and
saves on the cost of gas), reduces the incidence of fires, improves wildlife habitat and species
diversity, protects the watershed, and provides scenic value for ecotourism. Furthermore, the project
lowers the threat of land invasion for some communities, and increases environmental awareness
among all communities. Finally, although most of the communities in which the project takes place
have plantations, the community members lack training in the maintenance and marketing of
timber.1l7 These are issues that Profafor has committed itself to addressing as part of the project
design.
114 CIFOR. 200 1: S-6.
115 CIFOR. 2001: 7.
116 Jara, Louis Fernando. Interview AprilS, 2002.
117 CIFOR. 2000: 11.
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Chapter 4 - The Incentives and Disincentives of Forest Carbon Sequestration
4.1 Incentives to Participate in Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
While these three case studies are interesting examples of how global environmental objectives
are being realized through local environmental initiatives, they do not explicitly reveal the underlying
incentives behind stakeholders' participation in these kinds of projects or the fundamental challenges that
these projects face. In this chapter, I present the factors from these case studies that have most clearly
indicated why forest carbon sequestration projects have been initiated voluntarily, and discuss the major
scientific, social, economic, and political uncertainties that need to be addressed in order for forest carbon
sequestration projects to be better implemented.
4.1.1 Primary Incentive - the Market in GHG Emissions Reduction Credits
In general, the primary and underlying incentive to participate in these three forest carbon
sequestration projects was the potential market in GHG emissions reduction credits. Establishment of this
market would enable emitters to lower their emissions more cheaply in order to meet what are currently
voluntary emissions reduction goals, but what are expected to be mandatory requirements in the future.
Therefore, to reduce the risks that could be incurred by these requirements, participants set out to prove
the viability of forest carbon sequestration, which they recognized as one of the least-cost and most
environmentally sound ways to mitigate C02 emissions. By amassing project experience and scientific
knowledge on forest carbon sequestration, participants hoped to influence policy in its favor, because
when these projects were started, the Kyoto Protocol had not yet been negotiated, and the details of its
flexibility mechanisms were still being worked out.
Figure 12 - GHG Emissions Reduction Credits - Definitions
Carbon A "carbon offset" is the generic term for a metric ton of carbon, C02, or C02 equivalent that is reduced
offset or sequestered in a place other than where the emissions that it offsets were generated. A carbon offset is
not necessarily verified or authenticated in any way.
VER A "Verified Emission Reduction" is a unit created, in the absence of government rules, by project-based
activities that are defined by the buyer and seller and verified by an independent third party. VERs have
the possibility of being creditable by governments as CERs or ERUs if they fulfill the criteria that will be
set for them at COP-9 in 2003. VERs are equal to one metric ton of C02 equivalent.
CER A "Certified Emission Reduction" is a verified and authenticated unit of GHG reduction from abatement
or sequestration projects certified under Article 12 (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. A CER is equal to one
metric ton of C02 equivalent.
ERU An "Emission Reduction Unit" is a verified and authenticated unit of GHG reduction from abatement or
sequestration projects certified under Article 6 (11)of the Kyoto Protocol. An ERU is equal to one
metric ton of C02 equivalent
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While some participants got involved in these projects in order to acquire inexpensive carbon
offsets for which they hoped to get credit retroactively under a future formal emissions reduction
program, this was not a primary incentive when these projects first began. At the time, the chance to gain
practical experience in forest carbon sequestration, along with the low cost per ton of carbon and high
number of local economic and environmental benefits, were incentive enough for investors to put money
into these projects despite the uncertainty regarding the creditability of these projects in the global climate
change regime.
To landowners, the establishment of a market in carbon offsets was an incentive for them because
it adds value to existing forests in the form of people's willing to pay for the service of carbon
sequestration. Payment for this service provides discrete monetary returns for the conservation of
standing forests that are additional to the benefits from their scenic value and value as wildlife habitat. It
can also make forested land more profitable than other land uses, giving landowners the option to afforest
or reforest their land and take advantage of its attendant benefits.
By undertaking these projects, participants also hoped to demonstrate environmental leadership,
and in the case of many of the companies and NODs, to generate positive public relations for their
business or organization. For some emitters, projects were invested in for purely altruistic reasons,
because they believed that they had a responsibility as corporate or private citizens to reduce their OHG
emissions.
4.1.2 Secondary Incentives - Local Economic and Environmental Benefits
The secondary incentives to participate in these projects were the numerous local economic and
environmental benefits, including support for sustainable development and local capacity building, the
protection and enhancement of biodiversity, and the provision of environmental services. These benefits
were most important to the landowners, the host country governments, and the NODs that managed the
projects. They were also important to the emitters, because even if these projects did not turn out to be
creditable, then they would still have achieved many positive social and environmental impacts. Some of
the other incentives to participate in these projects were to gain a better understanding of tropical
ecosystems, promote sustainable forestry, and raise environmental awareness.
Therefore, despite emissions reductions not being mandatory, stakeholders participated in these
projects because of both the potential international market in emissions reduction credits and the more
immediate and local secondary benefits of the projects.
4.2 The Benefits of Developing a Market in Carbon Offsets
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In the case studies in Belize and Ecuador, the primary motivation for participation was the
potential market in carbon offsets. This was because the primary investors in these projects were electric
utilities and energy companies likely to be faced with regulation of their C02 emissions in the future. For
the Klinki project in Costa Rica, the primary motivation for participation was to engage local farmers in
carbon sequestration as an economic activity. This project thus depends on a system that endows carbon
sequestration with a monetary value, e.g. a market (albeit a very informal one, in this case) in carbon
offsets. Therefore, by implementing these projects, all three cases sought to develop the market in carbon
offsets, not just for their own purposes, but also for the benefit of having a market in general.
While the Rio Bravo and Klinki projects both involve carbon sequestration on behalf of specific
investors, the FACE Foundation, since its separation with NY SEP, has evolved as more of a non-profit
carbon business that both plants trees for specific investors and sells carbon offsets from trees already
planted through its commercial outlet, Business for Climate. This has fully entered it into the emerging
market of carbon commerce.
4.2.1 To Lower Compliance Costs and Reduce Business Risk
All of the electric utilities and energy companies involved in these projects expect their
compliance costs to increase with stricter emissions regulations. To mitigate these costs, these companies
want to be able to use carbon offsets as part of their emissions reduction strategy. For example, American
Electric Power (AEP), one of the members of the Utili tree Carbon Company, emits over 40 million tons
of carbon per year. IfAEP were required to reduce its emissions by 7% as was proposed for the US under
the Kyoto Protocol, it would be necessary for it to buy credits to meet this goal, as it would not be able to
reduce all of its emissions on-site. Getting involved in activities that would help create a market for
carbon credits therefore needs to be a part of its overall business plan.lls
So far, AEP has spent $30 million on overall emissions reductions. I19 In terms of cost per ton of
carbon offset or prevented, reducing emissions at its plants would have cost it much more than the offsets
produced by the Rio Bravo project, which were priced at $1.36/tC ($0.37/tC02).120 This figure was
considered reasonable compared to other emissions reduction projects (such as fuel switching and energy
efficiency projects);21 and is at the very low end of the range for credits offered in the emerging carbon
118Kaster, Gary. Interview March 7, 2002.
119Kaster, Gary. Interview March 7, 2002
120USIJI - Rio Bravo Project Proposal, 1994.
121Cutright, Noel. Interview March 14,2002.
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market.122 For the two Canadian investors (Nexen and Suncor), the price was 10-20% lower than the
price of offsets available in Canada.123
Even though the US has since made it clear that it will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the
development of a market in carbon credits would help to reduce any costs associated with the US's plan
to reduce emissions intensity (the amount of GHG emissions per $1 million GDP) by 18% by 2012.
While the plan is purely voluntary, it expands the program that encourages businesses to monitor and
report their GHG emissionsl24 in expectation of their use in a future formal emissions trading program.
In the case of the FACE Foundation, the fiscal value of the C02 credits (l C02 credit=1 tC02)
produced by its projects around the world were declared at 8 euros ($7.22) per credit as of the end of
fiscal year 2000.125 (Note: 1 tC02=0.27 tC, so 1 tC from FACE would cost $26.47).126 FACE transfers
its credits to Business for Climate, which then resells them to third parties for approximately 20-25
euro/tC02 ($66.05-82.72/tC). While this price is much higher than the price per tC in the Rio Bravo
project, it represents the current market price for VERso For NV SEP, the cost of the carbon offsets it
received from its investment in FACE is presumably lower than what it would have paid to reduce an
equivalent amount of C02 from its power plants in the Netherlands. FACE's wholesale price is also
competitive with offsets from investments in renewable energy as illustrated by the Dutch government's
2001 purchase of 4.62 million tons of C02-equivalent for just under 9 euros ($8 USD) per ton.127
While the offsets from the Rio Bravo project are worth less now that conservation has been ruled
ineligible in the CDM, the project's investors still consider the project a good deal because their first-
mover advantage enabled them to get a low initial price per tC along with valuable early gains in carbon
sequestration experience.128 The FACE/Profafor project has also benefited from "first-mover advantage"
in that they were able to obtain low-priced carbon offsets early on and develop standards in project design
and verification protocol that are now considered to be among the most reliable in the nascent
international market in carbon credits. In addition, by showing that voluntary action was being taken to
reduce emissions, the companies that participated in these projects helped stave off the advance of
mandatory regulations. In this sense, the project was a sensible "pre-emptive strike" to reduce business
risk.
122Rio Bravo investors named a range from $1-$25 as the current price for carbon offsets.
123Robson, Wishart. Interview March 12,2002.
124The Energy Policy Act section 1605(b) database
125FACE Foundation Annual Report 2000: 17.
126To convert tC02 to tC, multiply the uptake of C02 by the ratio of 44 tC02112 tC.
127This investment was for the development of wind, hydro, and biomass power plants in three eastern European
countries between 2008 and 2012. "Dutch Claim 1st Flexible Climate Deal Under Kyoto Protocol," April 19,2001
[http://www.ens-news.comlens/apr200 112001L-04-19-03.html].
128Kuhn, Eric. Interview Mach 11. Edmonds, Bill. Interview March 8, 2002.
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4.2.2 To Prove the Viability of Forest Carbon Sequestration
In 1995, the electric utility industry established the Utilitree Carbon Company, whose purpose
was to fund forest carbon management programs as a way to offset C02 emissions. From its involvement
in the Rio Bravo project, Utilitree has been able to show that if properly implemented, carbon
sequestration and forest management practices "are technically proven and can offset a large amount of
C02.,,129 As a consortium of electric utilities, Utilitree has a stake in proving the effectiveness of forest
carbon sequestration projects because it wants carbon offsets to be included as "a major component of any
domestic and international strategy to respond to greenhouse gas emissions.,,13o This support of market-
based mechanisms was echoed by all of the electric utility and energy company stakeholders, including
NV SEP of the Netherlands.
In Costa Rica, the Klinki project set out to prove that forest carbon sequestration is not only a
technically sound way to store carbon, it is also an economically viable activity for farmers. Local
economic viability is an essential component to the success of forest carbon sequestration projects. To
date, the Klinki model has proved to be beneficial for the small number of farmers involved in it, since
they receive more income per hectare from the project than from cattle grazing, plus income from the
trees that will be logged from the site over time.131 However, the long-term success of the project is less
clear because of the short amount of time and small amount of land involved in this project so far.
4.2.3 To Build Capacity and Scientific Knowledge
Proving the viability of forest carbon sequestration has involved a fair amount of scientific
inquiry, which is yet another incentive for stakeholder participation. In the case of the Klinki project, the
USDA, the Yale School of Forestry, and CATIE all offered technical assistance for the sake of scientific
inquiry without any expectation of remuneration. For the monitors and third-party verifiers whose
business it is to ensure the scientific validity of forest carbon sequestration (Winrock in the case of Rio
Bravo and SGS in the case of FACElProfafor), these projects have enabled them to gain experience in the
development of monitoring and verification protocols which may be used in the formation of international
standards for these practices. The NGOs (TNC, PFB, RTT, CACfU, and FACE/Profafor) were also
interested in the scientific knowledge that could be gained as part of a forest carbon sequestration project.
For example, through the Rio Bravo project, PFB has been able to carry out detailed forest inventories in
129Utilitree Carbon Company Factsheet.
130 Utili tree Carbon Company Factsheet.
I3l Rojas, Carlos Manuel. Interview March 20, 2002.
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order to do sustainable, reduced-impact logging, and has learned more about mahogany regeneration and
the carbon content of pine savannahs.132
Host countries and local communities also benefit from increased scientific understanding of their
ecosystems. Through the FACE Foundation, the Ecopar research project, a joint initiative between Loja
University in Ecuador and Amsterdam University and Larenstein International College in the
Netherlands, was set up to investigate native species reforestation.133 This project has been important for
Ecuador, where deforestation and non-native plantation forestry has resulted in little remaining local
knowledge about where forest used to grow, on what scale, and with which species. Through Ecopar, the
planting methods, silvicultural requirements, and practical value of many native species are being
investigated and documented, not only for FACE but also for the benefit of all Ecuadorians.
Another incentive for NGDs, host countries, and local communities to participate in forest carbon
sequestration projects is the educational benefit to local people from these projects, including training in
monitoring and verification procedures, and experience in scientific research. This capacity building took
place in all of the projects as local staff were hired and trained in a variety of skills from GIS to
silviculture to project management.
Host countries and institutions also benefit from the experience in having a forest carbon
sequestration project take place in their country, because officials get to learn first-hand about the
management of these projects and how to best take advantage of them and the emerging market in carbon
offsets in order to fulfill their country's sustainable development goals.
4.2.4 To Influence Policy
By participating in the Rio Bravo project, the electric utilities and energy companies hoped to get
"a seat at the table" in the policy arena.134 They felt that having experience with carbon sequestration
would make them "a more credible voice in world of carbon policy."135 So far, the experience with the
project has been use to support discussions between the companies and the US and Canadian
governments regarding GHG offsets and forest carbon sequestration, and on government recognition for
emissions reductions. 136
Participation in the project has also been used by TNC in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol
to promote forest carbon sequestration through the conservation of existing forests.137 Although
132 Novelo, Darrell. Interview January 22, 2002. Sabido, Wilber. Interview January 22, 2002.
133 FACE website, "Projects: Latin America: Ecuador."
134 Kaster, Gary. Interview March 7, 2002. Lambert, Gordon. Interview March 26, 2002. Edmonds, Bill.
Interview March 8, 2002.
135 Edmonds, Bill. Interview March 8,2002.
136 Lambert, Gordon. Interview March 26, 2002.
137 Kuhn, Eric. Interview March 11, 2002.
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conservation was ultimately not included in the CDM for the first commitment period, TNC plans to use
the Rio Bravo project as well as the other forest carbon sequestration projects that it oversees to push for
the inclusion of conservation under a US emissions reduction plan or in subsequent commitment
periods.138
Both the Rio Bravo and Klinki projects were implemented under the AU pilot phase to serve as
models of how forest carbon sequestration could be successfully accomplished. They hoped to influence
policy by demonstrating in real-world examples that the uncertainties of forest carbon sequestration could
be managed and that overall carbon benefits could result. Since there was little direction and clarity on
carbon sequestration coming from the top down in the international climate change regime at the time, the
participants wanted to, literally from the bottom up, sway the policy debate in favor of carbon
sequestration.
4.2.5 To Demonstrate Leadership, Obtain Positive PR, and Practice Altruism
All of the electric utilities and energy companies involved in the Rio Bravo project mentioned
their participation in the project as a way for them to demonstrate leadership in the environmental arena,
to build new partnerships with other utilities, and to establish or further a relationship with TNC and PFB.
The project was also an opportunity to generate positive public relations. Gordon Lambert, the vice-
president for sustainable development at Suncor, also felt that that the project "educates and involves
stakeholders in climate change issues, because it engages the imagination.,,139
TNC and PFB were also interested in the project in order to show leadership in the field of forest
carbon sequestration as a way to promote conservation, and for public relations purposes since they rely
significantly on donations to keep their organizations and projects running.
NY SEP's decision to found FACE in 1990 and its project in Ecuador in 1993, before many
people even knew the term carbon sequestration, was a clear sign of its environmental leadership, and is
reflective of the strong position that the Netherlands has taken in regard to many environmental issues,
especially climate change. Because about half of the Netherlands is below sea level, it has a huge
incentive to slow the rate of climate change, and the FACE Foundation is just one of the many programs
through which it is attempting to do this.l40
For the benefactors of the Klinki project, the reason to engage in the project was, for the most
part, altruistic concern for the problem of climate change. None of the benefactors to the project (except
perhaps CMEEC) is likely to have their C02 emissions regulated anytime in the near future, and even
CMEEC admittedly got involved in the project for altruistic and personal reasons (Dr. Barres, founder
138 Hawes, Ellen. Interview January 10,2002.
139 Lambert, Gordon. Interview March 26, 2002.
140 Woodward. September 4,2001.
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and president ofRTT, was a friend of the CMEEC board's general counsel).141 The Klinki project's
largest benefactor, the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, invested in the project to offset the C02
emissions from its integrated fuel cell/boiler/domestic hot water system at its Mohegan Sun Resort and
Casino to be in line its own air quality regulatory program that includes greenhouse gases.142 But they
also participated in the Klinki forestry project over alternative emissions reduction methods "because it is
easily implemented by a contractor, provides financial and technical assistance to a location where it is
seriously needed, compensates for past misuse of the earth, diminishes the negative argument that
offsetting is not feasible, provides valuable habitat for threatened wildlife, enhances tribal environmental
credibility, and is consistent with Native American cultural philosophy.,,143
One of the individual benefactors to the Klinki project, a professor at the Yale School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies, donated to the project in order to carbon-neutralize the effect of his family's
four cars. 144The Superior Nut Company in Cambridge also got involved to carbon-neutralize its
operations, as did Connecticut College, which neutralizes the emissions from the energy use of its student
center.145 In the FACE project, carbon neutrality was the reason for investment in FACE by the
government of Utrecht province and the Museon at the Hague.146 This kind of private-sector demand for
carbon-neutrality is expected to play an increasing role in the expansion of carbon sequestration projects.
For NY SEP and the energy companies involved in Rio Bravo, a certain amount of altruism and
the ethic of corporate social responsibility also played a part in their decisions to participate in these
projects. The projects' benefits did not solely accrue to them, they did not make a profit from their
investment, and there was no guarantee that the carbon offsets generated would be creditable (and indeed,
for the Rio Bravo project, they are not). So why did they invest in forest carbon sequestration projects?
Among the many other reasons, some participants also just felt that it was "the right thing to dO.,,147
4.3 The Benefits to Sustainable Development, the Local Economy, and the Environment
One of the main reasons why participants considered these forest carbon sequestration projects
"the right thing to do" were the projects' local social and environmental benefits. These benefits were a
strong incentive because they accrue regardless of whether the carbon sequestered has any value in a
carbon market. This factor made these projects into "win-win" investments for their participants.
141Stearn, Gabe. Interview March 18, 2002.
142Richards, Norman. Interview April I, 2002.
143Richards, Norman. Interview April 1, 2002.
144GebalIe, Gordon. Interview March 27, 2002.
145Hintlian, Harry. Interview March 20, 2002.
146FACE Annual Report 2002: 8.
147Hintlian, Harry. Interview March 20, 2002. Cutright, Noel. Interview March 14,2002.
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4.3.1 The Importance of Secondary Benefits to TNC and PFB
The environmental benefits of the Rio Bravo project are obvious incentives for TNC, whose
mission is "To preserve the plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on
Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive,,,148and for PFB, whose goal is to "promote
the conservation of the natural heritage of Belize and to promote wise use of its natural resources.,,149 By
providing funding for conservation, the Rio Bravo project helps TNC and PFB to achieve these
objectives.
Specifically, the RBCSPP contributes positively to the RBCMA's biodiversity, wildlife habitat,
water quality, and soil stability. The project secures habitat for nine mammals on CITES (Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species) Appendix 1 and over 341 migratory and resident bird species,
and promotes the regeneration of a diverse range of native flora. It also maintains water quality by
preserving land as forest instead of converting it to farmland, which would expose it to the use of
fertilizers, pesticides, and fungicides. In addition, the project's sustainable forestry regime and forest
management program increase the amount of ground cover to further reduce soil erosion. Forest
management also helps to enhance the commercial value of the forest through the regeneration of
valuable timber species and from more complete forest surveys that help ensure the sustainable harvest of
forest resources.150
Because these activities are labor-intensive, the project has improved employment in the local
area and has given workers new technical skills. Funds from the project have also been used to equip the
RBCMA's field stations with solar power generating systems and composting toilets, and have been
integrated into the management regime for the broader RBCMA, which includes protection of ancient
Mayan archeological sites.151
The project has also helped PFB get its timber certified by the Forest Stewardship Council and
Smartwood.152 The sale of sustain ably-harvested timber, however, which was expected to contributes to
PFB's overall operating budget and help maintain the project over its 40-year life, has not been as
profitable as was hoped, so logging has been discontinued while PFB reevaluates its feasibility.153 This
lack of revenue from sustainable forestry, combined with the fact that conservation has not turned out to
be creditable, shows that while social and environmental benefits are important in getting a project
started, there needs to be continued economic benefits in order to maintain a project.
148 TNC website.
149 Programme for Belize brochure, "An Opportunity for Positive Action."
150USIJI, Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 15.
151 USIJI, Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Pilot Project. September 1999: 15.
152Kaster, Gary. Interview March 7, 2002.
153 Sabido, Wilber. Interview January 22, 2002.
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4.3.2 The Importance of Secondary Benefits to Rio Bravo Investors
While all of the Rio Bravo electric utility and energy company investors mentioned that forest
carbon sequestration was just one of the many options they were using to reduce their GHG emissions,
the social and environmental benefits of the Rio Bravo project were found to have played a decisive part
in the companies' decision to invest in it. For example, in 1997, Suncor got involved because it was
looking for offset projects that were suitable demonstration projects, and Rio Bravo fit its internal action
plan commitments. Even though Canada had no domestic policy regarding emissions reductions at the
time, Suncor wanted to reduce its emissions, and its seven-element action plan, announced prior to Kyoto,
included the use of carbon offsets from forestry projects. Suncor looked into the USIJI program as a
source of quality assurance, and through informal networking within the energy industry, found out that
there was a share of the Rio Bravo project's Phase 2 still available. Suncor considered TNC to be a
credible organization with great project management skills, and through due diligence, were impressed
with TNC's work, both technically and managerially. Although they realized there was a policy risk in
the recognition of the project's carbon offsets, to their view the project had good environmental benefits,
and so Suncor invested. 154,155
The consideration of secondary benefits was also important to Nexen, who felt that the Rio Bravo
project was an attractive alternative to other offset projects because of its benefits to biodiversity
conservation, sustainable forestry, environmental education, and research on carbon sequestration in
tropical ecosystems. Nexen also mentioned that while the cost of the project was comparable to that of
other projects, they had more incentive to invest in Rio Bravo because the other projects lacked these
benefits. 156
For WEPCO, the secondary benefits were important, "because at the time, we weren't expecting
to get any real financial reward from the carbon credits.,,15? These benefits appeared to WEPCO as an
opportunity to "do the right thing" from an environmental perspective, and supported the company's
position that market-based mechanisms could be used to solve a multitude of environmental problems.158
Cinergy, when asked about the project's cost-effectiveness, evaluated it partly in terms of
biodiversity conservation. Cinergy considered the project successful because cat and bird populations in
154Lambert, Gordon. Interview March 26, 2002.
155Canadian Environment Minister Christine Stewart said of Suncor's involvement with Rio Bravo: "This is the
kind of win- win-win solution envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol last year ... Belize protects its endangered forests;
Suncor Energy demonstrates a new, cost-effective approach; and the environment wins from a significant reduction
in greenhouse gas emissions." "Suncor Energy Supports Forest Conservation Project In Belize," November 12,
1998.
156Robson, Wishart. Interview March 12, 2002.
157Cutright, Noel. Interview March 14,2002.
158Cutright, Noel. Interview March 14,2002.
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the RBCMA were found to have risen. It was also pleased with its investment because the project
contributed to research on carbon sequestration, environmental education programs for children from the
US, Mexico, and Belize at Rio Bravo, and economic benefit for local people from non-timber forest
products such as sabal palm thatch, chicle, and ornamental plants, and from ecotourism.159
Utilitree felt that the opportunities for reduced-impact logging, the certification of sustainably
harvested timber, the regeneration of mahogany and other species, research on carbon sequestration, and
biodiversity and habitat conservation all made the Rio Bravo project more attractive than other offset
projects. 160
Finally, Pacificorp, who has been involved in carbon offset projects since the early 1990s, found
Rio Bravo to be an attractive alternative to other offset projects because of its low cost and because it
wanted some international projects in its emissions reduction project portfolio, which would aid in its
goal of "being a more sustainable company.,,161
4.3.3 The Importance of Secondary Benefits to the Klinki Project
The Klinki project, because it is more of a charitable tree-planting program to benefit the
environment and local farmers than a carbon credit program to offset emissions from industry, depends
more highly on the project to obtain local economic and environmental benefits. Primarily, its farmers
need to be assured of enough income and environmental service from a Klinki Matrix forest in order to
want to reforest their pastures. The project provides for this by developing a mixture of trees that can be
sold to generate short- and long-term income for the farmer, which also help stabilize and enrich the soil,
improve water habitats and stream flow, reduce the use of chemicals as low-yield crops are shifted to
forest plantations, and increase biodiversity by nurturing a new understory with native species.162
One of the farmers who had worked with Dr. Barres of RTf earlier on agroforestry projects
involving macadamia nuts and heart of palm felt confident enough after seeing the growth of a trial plot
of Klinki trees to reforest 24 hectares of his cattle pastures with Klinki Matrix trees.163 After three years
in the project, the farmer commented that his trees were growing well and that thinning would be
profitable. Because of this, he put himself at an 8 out of 10 in confidence that the project would be self-
sustaining through its 25-year lifetime. 164
The benefactors of the Klinki project also felt confident about the project and its ability to
sequester carbon. While their primary incentive was to offset their carbon emissions, they also donated to
159Kuhn, Eric. Interview March 11, 2002.
160 Kaster, Gary. Interview March 7, 2002.
161 Edmonds, Bill. Interview March 8, 2002.
162 USIJI - Klinki Forestry Project. September 1999: 11.
163 Rojas, Carlos Manuel. Interview March 20, 2002.
164Rojas, Carlos Manuel. Interview March 20, 2002.
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the project because of its secondary benefits. For example, some of the reasons that the Mohegan Tribe
participated in the project were because it provides valuable habitat for threatened wildlife, compensates
for past misuse of the earth, and provides financial and technical assistance to rural Costa Ricans.165
Connecticut College, by compensating for some of its emissions, wanted to create "a more sustainable
campus and world.,,166 In addition, Superior Nut felt that planting trees was one of the most sensible
ways to deal with climate change, and that from an environmental standpoint, the initiative was "a win-
win project that not many people could object to. ,,167
4.3.4 The Importance of Secondary Benefits to the FACElProfafor Project
The FACE Foundation, now one of the world's largest producers of VERs, has not lost sight of
the need for benefits to accrue to all its projects' stakeholders. FACE's mission is to "establish and
protect forests (or enable their establishment and conservation) sustainably and responsibly, in suitable
areas, wherever in the world, and by so doing to contribute to reducing the amount of C02 in the
atmosphere.,,168 This pledge has meant that FACE has invested a significant effort in making sure that its
forests benefit both the natural and the human environment in the areas in which they are planted.
Because FACE only uses one function of the forests it plants - their ability to sequester C02 - the
other properties of the forest are available to the forest owner. For landowners with limited access to
credit and degraded pasture or farmland, the FACElProfafor project provides a source of short-and long-
term capital in the form of initial funding and eventual timber revenue, and assists communities in forest
management to decrease soil erosion and increase soil fertility. Its planting activities generate local
employment, and the development of natural and plantation forestry diversifies the area's economy.
The project also increases access to firewood, reduces the incidence of forest fires, improves wildlife
habitat and species diversity, protects the watershed, and provides scenic value for ecotourism. In
addition, the project lowers the threat of land invasion for some communities, and increases
. 1 11" 169envlfonmenta awareness among a commumtIes.
This multitude of benefits is necessary to persuade individuals and communities to plant and
maintain forests on their lands for at least 99 years. Figures 13 and 14, generated from a survey of
communities and individuals under contract with FACE/Profafor that was carried out by the Center
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in 2000, shows the constraints that these landowners
face, and Figure 15 shows the benefits that the project offers, the needs that the project has met or is
165Richards, Norman. Interview April 1, 2002.
166 "CC First College in Nation to Initiate Carbon Dioxide Emissions Compensation Program." Fall 1999: 3.
167Hintlian, Harry. Interview March 20, 2002.
168FACE website, "Methods and Projects: Mission Statement."
169CIFOR. 2001: 12-13.
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expected to meet, and the needs that have not been met by the project. While the project provides
many social, economic, and environmental benefits to landowners, these benefits need to be strong
enough to make up for the needs that are not and in some cases cannot be helped by the project itself,
such as high interest rates, regressive government policies, corrupt external organizations, and bad
weather. So far, landowners have been generally satisfied with the benefits from the project.170 In
the future, however, after the benefits from the initial funding have been digested, the project's
environmental benefits need to contribute meaningfully to social and economic benefits in order for
the project to be successful.
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Figure 15 - Community perceptions of FACElProfafor's impacts on capital endowments173
Assets Community needs met Community needs not met by
and expected to be met project
by project
Financial capital
Short term
- PROFAFOR reforestation subsidy Access to financial Access to lower interest rates
financed employment in the capital
establishment of the plantation and
surplus funds for other individual
and communal needs
Long term
- Timber revenues According to the project Market access
- Mushroom revenues Director, PROFAFOR
- Firewood revenues (or saved cost had begun talks with
of gas) Increased land value timber companies on
behalf of the beneficiaries
Physical capital
- Surplus funds from subsidy Infrastructure Irrigation
invested in communal needs
(shelter for plantation manager,
benches)
- Provision of gates by project
- Timber from plantation for
construction
- Establishment of nursery for
plantations over 1000 ha
Human capital
- Training in forestry and nursery Extension services Access to skilled labour to work
maintenance on plantation
Social capital
- Halted land invasions and theft of Threat of land invasions Government policies
livestock
- Curbed migration to towns and External projects Lack of Government services
cities during plantation (roads, water)
establishment
- Transfer of knowledge by project Corrupt external organisations
to local nurseries
- Influencing other communities to
grow plantations
- Expected benefits of plantation to
future generations
- Community conflict over grazing in
plantation
Natural/environmental capital
- Fuelwood Access to fuelwood Climatic factors (frosts and
drought)
- Increased fauna and native Population increase reducing
species in plantation areas availability of land
- Cleaner air Environmental
awareness
- Reduced incidence of forest fires
- Watershed protection
- Scenic value for ecotourism
173 CIFOR. 2001: 13.
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4.3.5 The Importance of Secondary Benefits to Host Countries
For the host countries, participation in these forest carbon sequestration projects provides benefits
that help fulfill their sustainable development goals, including the restoration of degraded lands,
biodiversity and wildlife habitat conservation, watershed protection, renewable resource provision,
poverty reduction, and sustainable tourism development.
For Belize, the goal of its present administration is to balance economic development and
biodiversity management. To this end, its forest department has recently changed its focus from logging
to watershed management, tourism development, carbon sequestration, and non-timber forest products.174
Having intact, healthy forests is a major part of Belize's overall development plan, because tourism is
now its single largest income generator, bringing in more revenue than sugar, bananas, or citrus. Also,
because most of its tourists come for ecotourism, Belize needs thriving forests in order to sustain this
market niche.175
Belize also wanted to participate in forest carbon sequestration to prove that it is a good host.
Carlos Fuller, Belize's Chief Meteorologist and Coordinator of the Belize Climate Change Project, stated,
"Belize, being the first country to have gotten a forestry project acknowledged and funded under the
USIJI, shows that we are on the forefront of any type of climate change project. So we have gained a
reputation as a good host for other projects.,,176 Belize was also happy to participate in the Rio Bravo
project because TNC, PFB, and the investors took full responsibility for it; the government did not have
to put anything into the project, except for some staff time. Receiving a share of PFB' s carbon offsets
was also an incentive to Belize initially, when it was thought that conservation might be creditable under
the CDM. Despite the project's lack of creditability, the government of Belize is still very positive about
the project, because "while the investors basically lost out, the environment gained."l77
Costa Rica also sees forest carbon sequestration as a major part of its overall development plan.
Since 1994, Costa Rica has based its plan on the concept of sustainable development, which it defines as
"development which represents the balance provided by political stability, social equity, economic
stability and development in hannony with nature.,,178 Some of the priorities laid out between 1994-
1998 by the administration were to consolidate and improve the management of protected areas, to further
increase clean energy generation and energy efficiency, to protect biodiversity by consolidating the park
system, to make the economy more open and balanced, and to incorporate civil society and the private
sector into the decision making process. Costa Rica's involvement with AU projects, including
174 Chun, Angel. Interview January 29, 2002
175 Fuller, Carlos. Interview January 29, 2002.
176 Fuller, Carlos. Interview January 29, 2002.
177 Fuller, Carlos. Interview January 29, 2002.
178 Hambleton, Figueres, and Kalipada, 2000: 3.
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reforestation and conservation, wind and hydropower development, and wastewater treatment, has helped
it to achieve these goals.179 Because Costa Rica was the first developing country to realize that AU
projects could be used as a tool to finance national sustainable development priorities and establish an
office for joint implementation (OCIC), it is now host to the most AU projects of any non-Annex 1
country, including four forest carbon sequestration projects.
While the Klinki project is currently at a very small scale, Costa Rica had incentive to participate
in it because it had the potential to significantly benefit its sustainable development plan. Besides
providing income to farmers through payments for reforestation and revenue from timber sales, the
project helps protect water resources, increases wildlife habitat, reduces soil erosion, and also reduces the
pressure to log existing forests, much of which lie in parks and protected areas.
In Ecuador, the government's primary incentive to get involved in the FACE/Profafor project was
to reforest the once forest-rich Andes.180 It agreed to cooperate with FACE because FACE was willing to
work with the farming communities in this area. Since the Ecuadorian Ministry of Environment signed
its 1993 contract with FACE to plant 5,000 hectares of new forest per year for a total of 75,000 hectares,
over 25,000 hectares of forest have been planted.18t Besides providing valuable environmental services
and helping the local economy, the project contributes to sustainable development in Ecuador by
establishing a link between environmental preservation and economic development, thereby helping its
population understand the concept of sustainable development. It also promotes participation by the local
population in solving environmental problems.t82 Ecuador further benefits from the research carried out
by Ecopar, and is aided by the establishment of an NOO presence that assists and supplements
governmental action on environmental issues.
4.4 Uncertainties in Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
Despite the numerous incentives to participate in forest carbon sequestration projects, there are
still many inherent uncertainties in both the process and the politics of carbon sequestration. Because
these projects are based on natural systems, engage a multitude of stakeholders, and require complex
monitoring and accounting systems to take stock of carbon benefits, carbon sequestration is a continuous
work in progress. As shown above, projects differ greatly in terms of stakeholders, project design, host
country, and specific locale. This diversity has meant that there has been little standardization between
projects, which makes them difficult to compare. Also, there has been little international agreement on
179 Hambleton, Figueres, and Kalipada, 2000: 5-6.
180 FACE Annual Report 2000: 14.
181 FACE website, "Projects: Latin America: Ecuador."
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the details of the criteria and methodologies for forest carbon sequestration projects under the CDM, in
part because many of these details are still being determined through experience with current projects.
While many of the questions about forest carbon sequestration have been answered through
projects that have already been established, a number of general uncertainties regarding project design,
international policy, the market in carbon offset credits, and host country capacity still need to be
addressed in order to lower transaction costs and advance the development of forest carbon sequestration
projects. The interconnectedness of this global process means that perhaps the most important task of
forest carbon sequestration is to ensure that its benefits accrue to all stakeholders, because without joint
benefit from joint implementation, these projects will be quickly undermined.
4.4.1 Project Criteria
When these projects were first started, the criteria for forest carbon sequestration projects had not
yet been established by any internationally-agreed upon forum. While FACE, because it was one of the
first projects, established its own criteria, the Rio Bravo and Klinki projects followed the later USIJI
criteria in order to be USIJI-approved. Established in 1994, the USIJI's nine criteria require that projects:
1. Be acceptable to the government of the host country
2. Involve specific measures to reduce or sequester GHG emissions
3. Reduce or sequester GHG emissions beyond what would happen in absence of the project
(additionality)
4. Identify associated environmental and developmental benefits and impacts
5. Provide data and methodological information to establish a baseline of current and future GHG
emissions in the absence of the project and as a result of the project
6. Contain adequate provisions for monitoring GHG emissions reduced or sequestered as a result of
the project, for periodically modifying such estimates, and for comparing actual results with
those originally projected
7. Contain adequate provisions for external verification of the GHG emissions reduced or
sequestered by the project.
8. Provide adequate assurance that GHG emissions reduced or sequestered over time will not be
lost or reversed (leakage)
9. Provide for annual reports to the Evaluation Panel on the emissions reduced or sequestered, and
on the share of such emissions attributed to each of the participants-domestic and foreign-
pursuant to the terms of voluntary agreements among participantsl83
183 USIJI. "Part Three: USIJI National Program Report." September 1999: 3.
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A year later at COP-1 in 1995, the Parties to the FCCC adopted three basic criteria for the
international pilot phase on AU, of which the USIJI projects now became a part. In addition to requiring
governmental approval by both Parties, the AU criteria further distinguish the concept of additionality by
requiring that projects should result in real, measurable and long-term reductions in net GHG emissions
that would not have occurred in the absence of such an activity (emissions additionality), and that projects
should be financed outside current Official Development Assistance (financial additionality).184
In 1997, when the CDM was agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol, it called for projects to have
emissions additionality, but it made no mention of financial additionality. The CDM's additional
requirement was that projects should contribute to the sustainable development goals of the host country.
At the most recent COP in Marrakech (COP-7 in November 2001), it was agreed that the definitions,
criteria, and procedures for CDM projects, including those involving afforestation and reforestation,
would be developed as an Annex to the Kyoto Protocol which could be expected to be adopted at COP-9
in 2003.185 Until then, projects that hope to be creditable under the CDM can only anticipate what these
criteria will be.
Of the criteria already established, the most challenging ones have been proving that the
emissions reduced or sequestered would not have occurred in the absence of the project (additionality),
assuring that emissions reduced or sequestered would not be lost or reversed over time (permanence),
establishing a baseline and predicting future emissions, monitoring the emissions reduced or sequestered,
and verifying the emissions reduced or sequestered. Another important criteria for forestry projects is
ensuring that the emissions reduced or sequestered within the project's boundaries are not negated by
actions away from the project site (leakage). Determining ground-rules for accounting and sustainability
has also been a challenge. These are discussed below in general and in regard to the three case studies.
4.4.2 Additionality
As mentioned above, the AU pilot phase considers two different aspects of additionality:
emissions and financial additionality. In the Rio Bravo project, the emissions additionality of its carbon
benefits is clear. From contacts with other local landowners, PFB knew that its Mennonite neighbors
would have purchased the two newly acquired parcels and converted them to agricultural production.
Also, the land now under the sustainable forest management plan would have been logged under
customary practices without the funding required to undertake reduced-impact logging.186 In the Klinki
project, the farmers, because they lacked a profitable alternative, would have kept their lands as pasture or
184UNFCCC COP-I. 1995: Decision 5.
185 UNFCCC COP-7. November 2001: Part 3, Decision -/CP.7, 20 Section lOb.
186 TNC website, "Rio Bravo."
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crops.187 In Ecuador, the previous government fund to reforest the Andes dried up when oil prices fell
during the 1980s, and the farmers in the area lack almost all access to credit, so the project would
definitely not have happened if FACE did not intervene.188 The projects are financially additional
because the Klinki project relies completely on small-scale private sector donations, and the Rio Bravo
and FACE projects were begun as private and voluntary initiatives by electric utilities and energy
companies.
Additionality is difficult to prove because it requires assumptions about what would happen in the
absence of a project. These assumptions are based on extrapolations of historical land use trends, analysis
of the local socio-economic situation, judgment about future regional, national, and even international
economic and political developments, as well as other factors that are inherently uncertain and
unpredictable. A report on estimating the GHG benefits of forestry projects that used Costa Rica as its
case study concluded, "The difficulty of predicting social, demographic, economic, and political
developments over time is the greatest analytical challenge in estimating emission reductions in
forestry.189 These predictions, however, are necessary not only to prove additionality, but also to establish
the project baseline against which emissions reductions are measured.
4.4.3 Baselines, Monitoring, and Verification
Baselines
For forest carbon sequestration projects, the establishment of a baseline requires first a forecast of
the extent of future land use change in the absence of the project, and second an estimation of the carbon
flows associated with these changes.l90 As mentioned above, the first part of this process is already a
huge analytical challenge. The difficulty of determining a reliable baseline is further compounded by the
fact that in a market for carbon offsets, buyers and sellers both have the incentive to establish baselines
that exaggerate the amount of offsets resulting from the project, because if more offsets are available,
buyers might get lower prices and sellers would receive more revenue. There is a general concern that
baseline inaccuracies could lead to a net increases in GHG emissions from forest carbon sequestration
projects if Annex 1 countries use inaccurate projects to claim that they have satisfied their emission
reduction commitments, when in fact they have exceeded them. Baselines that exaggerate carbon benefits
might also divert investment away from better projects with more accurate baselines.191
187 Barres, Herster. Interview March 14,2002.
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Because one of the main incentives for the Rio Bravo project was to investigate the scientific
accuracy of forest carbon sequestration, the baseline and monitoring protocols for both Component A and
B of the project have been thoroughly investigated and refined several times. Winrock's credibility as a
forest carbon monitoring firm depends on the accuracy and verifiability of its methodologies, so it has
kept the baseline dynamic in order to make it as correct as possible. To this end, its procedures are
transparently described in its project documents.
Calculating a baseline for reforestation projects can be somewhat easier. In the Klinki project, it
is assumed that without the project, the land would remain pasture or farmland. Therefore, the reference
scenario puts emissions at zero since it assumes that carbon stocks would remain the same if the project
did not take place.192 The same can generally be said for the reference scenario in the FACE/Profafor
project. In the Klinki project, sequestration rates for Klinki Matrix forest are based on data gathered
from pure Klinki stands planted in the Turrialba region over the last 26 years. There was not enough
empirical data on the growth of mixed stands to make a more accurate estimate, so the sequestration rate
was set conservatively on the Klinki stands to account for that. Estimates were also set conservatively in
the FACElProfafor project for areas of native species reforestation because there was also little evidence
on the growth characteristics and sequestration rate of many native species.
One of the issues for FACFJProfafor has been establishing a reliable baseline for its projects in
the coastal provinces. The problem here has been a lack of historic information (maps, photos, satellite
imagery, etc) on land use, which makes it difficult for them to establish trends and make predictions about
future land use patterns in the absence of the project. Because of this and because the landowners in this
area do not have clear title to their land, the projects have been called off while further research is done.
However, the huge potential for projects in this area because of the faster growth rate of its trees, the
ability of FACE to use 100% native species, and the greater biodiversity value of its forests makes FACE
willing to try to overcome the challenges of working in this area.193
Monitoring and Verification
The problem with monitoring is that, in the absence of international standards, the variables that
are monitored, the frequency of monitoring activities, and the reliability of monitoring activities all differ
greatly from project to project. Monitoring also differs between the different kinds of forest carbon
sequestration projects. Standards need to be developed to be able to compare among and between these
projects, and also to facilitate the verification of these projects.
192 USIJI - Klinki Forestry Project. September 1999: 13.
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For the Rio Bravo project, PFB and Winrock coordinate monitoring activities. Winrock also
internally verifies project results. For both Components A and B, data are collected on aboveground
biomass and necromass, estimated belowground biomass, ~nd soil carbon. For Component B, the amount
of damage per harvested tree (e.g., the road, skid trail, and log landing areas and the volume of coarse
woody debris), the destination of harvested biomass (e.g., the proportion of extracted timber in durable
products and the fossil-fuel substitution by wood waste), and the impact of fire suppression activities
(e.g., actual area burned in a fire event that was suppressed by PFB crews, and estimated amount of land
that would have been burned in the absence of fire suppression activities) are also assessed.194
Since it takes at least two months to do all these measurements and because the forest was not
growing fast enough to warrant frequent measurement, one of the refinements to the process was that
monitoring activities were adjusted from being performed every two years to every four years.195 There
have been other technical refinements as well, such as the establishment of nested monitoring plots,
additional surveying of the project area, and the determination of better estimates of biomass and soil
carbon.
In the Klinki project, Dr. Barres, a tropical forester for over 40 years, developed the baseline
calculations and the monitoring protocols with help from colleagues and the many technical assistants to
the project (primarily CACTU). The project's monitoring activities include data collection on plot size,
vegetation size, soil and subsoil organic matter content, and tree carbon content.196 While these activities
are adequate, they are not as complete as those done in Rio Bravo, in part because the Klinki project does
not require a high degree of accuracy.
In both the Rio Bravo and Klinki projects, there is no third-party verification because these
projects were not established to sell VERso In contrast, for the FACFJProfafor project, monitoring is done
by Profafor, but verification is done by SGS, who, based on the baseline and monitoring protocols it
helped develop, certifies the emissions sequestered by the project. Its methodology includes a risk
analysis that estimates losses from fire, landslides, insect and fungal attack, volcanoes and earthquakes,
establishment and maintenance, demonstrability, 197 and the position of the baseline and with-project
scenario.198 These potential losses constitute a buffer of approximately 25% of total C02 sequestered,
which is held in reserve and cannot be sold unless risks are found to be lower than previously established.
This buffer helps ensure the reliability of the credits that are sold, but it also raises project costs and
194 USBI - Rio Bravo Project. September 1999: 13.
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therefore the cost of the credits. While SGS verifies the emissions sequestered and provides for a buffer
in case anything happens to the VERs that are sold, prior to the definition of appropriate procedures under
the CDM, it cannot guarantee the delivery of eligible Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) under the
Kyoto Protocol.199
In regard to monitoring in the FACE/Profafor project, one of SGS's criticisms was that following
the three-year establishment phase, there was no formal system for monitoring continued management of
the plantations.200 Specifically, one of the three Minor Corrective Action Requests in SGS' s December
2000 certification document was that "No clear guidelines exist how Profafor will continue monitoring
the plantations and the partners' ability to comply with the terms of the contract.,,201 While monitoring
and verification costs are figured into the overall cost of all of the projects, FACE's 99-year project
lifetime makes accounting for monitoring especially problematic. The lack of a long-term monitoring
plan also calls into question the project's permanence, which is discussed in the following section.
4.4.4 Permanence
Permanence, meaning that emissions reduced or sequestered are not lost or reversed over time, is
an issue that is approached differently by each of the projects. Since PFB owns the RBCMA and holds it
in trust for the people of Belize, the permanence of the emissions reduced or sequestered by the project
can be more reliably ensured. Control of fire and illegal wood harvesting in the area also help to reduce
the unintended loss of forest and new emissions of carbon dioxide. In addition, an endowment fund has
been established as part of the project in order to keep it going after the initial 10-year investment period
and through its 40-year lifetime. However, since conservation has turned out to not be creditable under
the CDM, and since the sustainable forestry program has been discontinued because the cost of
inventorying the trees was too high, the price of timber too low, and both the general export market and
the local market for secondary hardwoods too small, the independent financial viability of PFB is not as
optimistic as was hoped.202 While this is not expected to threaten the existence of the Rio Bravo project,
it does show how conservation and sustainable development are difficult to achieve when policy and
economics are not in their favor.
In Costa Rica, the issue of permanence has as much to do with institutions as it does with land use
change. RTf is a small organization formed solely to develop this project, and is basically a one-man
show. When it was first proposed, Dr. Barres, RTT's founder, hoped to obtain $6 million in federal
funding to plant and maintain 6,000 hectares of trees to offset emissions, and to establish an operating
199 SGS Product and Process Certification. December 5, 2000: v.
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201 SGS Product and Process Certification. December 5, 2000: viii.
202 Novelo, Darrell. Interview January 22, 2002. Sabido, Wilber. Interview January 22, 2002.
61
fund that would support the program for several decades. Since that funding did not materialize, RTT
was established as a non-profit organization in order to receive donations to develop the project as it is
today, which consists of 87 hectares. While these 87 hectares will probably remain as forest for 25 years
because the farmers with whom Dr. Barres contracts are not small, subsistence farmers but rather medium
to large, well-established landowners who do not need to make profit on all their land every year, the
permanence of RTT as an institution is less certain. The questionable long-term viability of RTT casts
doubt on how well it can ensure the permanence of the forest it establishes through the project life.
In Ecuador, while FACElProfafor's initial contracts were signed for 15 or 20 years, it has
transitioned to offering only 99-year contracts, which were developed to promote sustainability and a
longer forest life.203 To ensure the permanence of the shorter contracts, the project's emphasis has moved
from meeting annual planting targets to creating sustainable and productive integrated forestry systems?04
To ensure the permanence of the 99-year contracts, FACE/Profafor intends to establish an institutional
presence in Ecuador that ties into the country's sustainable development goals and helps with the transfer
of development aid.205 Also, it has been contracting with more large individual landowners than
communities, and is inquiring with water and power companies who own a lot of land, because they "are
not interested in the wood, they don't need it for immediate revenue - they need it for soil and water
conservation" and would therefore be less likely to cut down their trees.206
The issue of permanence is problematic because all of these countries are developing and
undergoing varying amounts of land use change, and because they involve or affect populations who may
be more concerned about short-term survival than long-term ecological sustainability. While the projects
contain many requirements and incentives to keep the forest as forest through (and hopefully after) the
projects' lifetimes while benefiting landowners and the local population, it is difficult to determine how
the opportunity cost of the land on which the forest is grown will change, and how this will effect the
projects.
The FACElProfafor project outlines the requirements and incentives to maintain the forests it
plants in its legal contracts with landowners. Under the 15-,20-, and 99-year contracts, if trees are felled
before the end of the contract, the landowner is obligated to meet the cost of replanting. If a landowner
converts the forest back to pasture or any other land use during the contract period, the project retains
30% of the timber revenues. In the 15- and 20-year contracts, if the landowner clear-cuts at the end of the
contract period, the project also retains 30% of the timber revenues, but if the landowner decides to renew
203 Jara, Louis Fernando. Interview AprilS, 2002.
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the contract, then the 30% is reinvested into replanting.207 Under the 99-year contracts, FACE/Profafor
assumes that after 20 years some trees will be cut and replanting will occur. In these contracts, however,
landowners are required to mortgage their land to Profafor, and should they default on their contract,
Profafor can expropriate their land.208 Under Ecuadorian law this clause does not apply to indigenous
communities.209 For its part, FACE/Profafor provides or intends to provide other services to ensure the
permanence of its projects, such as technical assistance throughout the project life and help identifying
markets for timber.
In a report issued by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) which used FACE's
project in Ecuador as a case study to investigate the impact of forest carbon sequestration projects on rural
livelihoods, it was felt that Profafor did not provide the communities enough incentives to ensure that the
forests would be kept for the duration of the contract. The report criticized Profafor's adoption of "a
'disincentive' approach" to prevent communities from converting their plantations to other land uses,
stating that it was unclear how enforceable its penalties would be and whether they were a sufficient
deterrent to prematurely logging the new forests, especially if community income sources were Iimited.210
In its 99-year contracts, FACE is attempting to manage these problems by setting up guidelines to
evaluate the social and environmental situation in its project areas, executing more extensive research in
advance of signing contracts to ensure that landowners can fulfil FACE's criteria and live up to the
project's requirements, and by choosing to work with larger individual and institutional landowners as
well as more socially cohesive communities that have contiguous landholdings.21l,212
The report also found that while the shorter-term contracts were expected to be profitable, the 99-
year contracts were likely to be unprofitable from a purely financial perspective. This was said to be
especially true if the opportunity cost of the land were to rise, which was expected to happen in areas
where the communities' populations have been expanding, thus increasing the demand for individual
grazing and agricultural land. However, the report concluded that communities interested in both the
financial and the environmental benefits of the project would be likely to gain, and that opportunity costs
in the Ecuadorian Sierra around 3000-4000 meters above sea level are likely to remain low even with
increasing population, because the soil and climate there do not provide better alternatives than forestry.
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4.4.5 Leakage
Another important criteria has been making sure that the emissions reduced or sequestered within
the project's boundaries are not negated by actions off-site caused by the project, commonly known as
leakage. This can be a problem because it is often difficult to determine causality, especially in countries
with imperfect information on land use change, financial transactions, and land ownership.
In the Rio Bravo project, PFB was able to follow the paper trail of the logging company from
whom they bought the two parcels of land to make sure they did not invest it in more forestland to log.
They also got historical and current LANDSAT data for Belize to research trends in deforestation within
the country.213 For the Klinki project, RTT and CACTU, through social networks, checked to make sure
that farmers do not deforest any of their forested lands because of the project. In Ecuador,
FACElProfafor has established the MONIS (monitoring and information) system to keep track of their
projects, which is a database that links alphanumeric and graphic information of FACE's project around
the world and includes a variety of maps, photos, and satellite imagery that help determine land use
trends?14
Even with good data on land use trends, it is hard to explicitly prove that forestation in one area
caused deforestation in another. Also, even if causality is determined, there is no guideline in any of the
projects on what to do about it.
4.4.6 Accounting
Since the rules governing forest carbon sequestration projects have yet to be fully determined, it
is difficult to compare the carbon offsets from one project with those of another project according to price
or the amount of offsets generated. Project costs vary according to the cost of labor at the project
location, the cost of monitoring and verification, and the survival rate of the trees, among many other
variables. The amount of offsets generated varies by sequestration method (e.g. conservation vs.
reforestation) and by the number of offsets held back in a buffer, if any. Also, offset price can be
determined differently from project to project. FACE bases its prices on what it thinks it needs to
continue the projects, and on what gives it a good position in the market. For futures, FACE calculates its
price based on the net present value of the investment and project costs for the next 50 or 99 years,
depending on the product they sel1.215FACE also puts some of its offsets in a buffer, and resells the
available offsets through Business for Climate, both of which increase the price. The Klinki project, on
the other hand, bases its offset price on what it needs to pay its farmers a fair amount plus the
213 Kuhn, Eric. Interview March 11, 2002.
214 Profafor website, "MONIS."
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administrative costs of keeping the project running. It does not have to pay for external verification, nor
does it subtract offsets for a buffer. The offsets from these two projects are therefore incomparable. This
also underscores the fact that it is hard to tell the quality of a credit (e.g. how permanent it really is) just
by looking at its price.
The different variables that projects monitor also influence the overall accounting of estimated
emissions reduced or sequestered. For example, the Rio Bravo project monitors the destination of
harvested biomass (e.g. the proportion of extracted timber in durable products and the fossil-fuel
substitution by wood waste) and the impact of fire suppression activities (e.g. the actual area burned in a
fire event that was suppressed by PFB crews, and the estimated amount of land that would have been
burned in the absence of fire suppression activities). If other projects did not also take these factors into
account then their offset estimates would be fundamentally different.
4.4.7 Sustainability
Forest carbon sequestration needs to be sustainable in many ways. It needs to contribute to a host
country's sustainable development goals, be able to sustain (or at least fairly supplement) the livelihoods
of forest landowners, as well as be ecologically sustainable. In an ecological sense, conservation is most
the sustainable carbon sequestration activity in terms of reducing C02 emissions, because it both prevents
deforestation and enables sequestration over a long period of time.
As for afforestation and reforestation, three of the issues that have to do with sustain ability are the
amount of land that gets reforested, the kind of trees that are used for reforestation, and the amount of
time that reforested land remains forested. For example, while Costa Rica and Ecuador both welcome
forest carbon sequestration projects, if too much of their land gets devoted to carbon sequestration, this
might lead to a situation that is economically and politically unsustainable. The Forests and Climate
Change Project in Central America (Proyecto Bosques y Cambio Climatico en America Central), which
started in September 2001, is helping Central American countries identify their opportunities under the
CDM, taking into account this issue of scale?J6 In Ecuador, FACE addresses the issue of scale in its
projects by mandating that no more than half of a community's land can be put under plantation. This
also helps keep land available in the event of future competition with other land uses.217
One of the local sustainability conflicts for FACElProfafor was the issue of whether to plant
native or non-native species. The communities prefer non-native species like pine and eucalyptus
because they know how to grow them and have a better market for them. However, FACE/Profafor
considers native species more ecologically sustainable, and SGS was concerned that eucalyptus may
216 Frutos, Ramon. January 23, 2002.
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contribute to the degradation of soils rather than their protection.218 FACE was also under pressure from
investors to plant native species. Initially, FACElProfafor permitted the planting of non-native species,
on condition that after the first felling, native trees would be planted.219 Research by Ecopar into the
value and use of native species was also initiated. In 1998, FACElProfafor started to require that all new
contracts include at least 30% native tree species, and since 1999, the new contracts signed plant more
area with native species than with non-native species.220 As an incentive, FACElProfafor pays
landowners more to plant native rather than non-native species.
An issue related to scale and ecological sustain ability that was pointed out by SGS is that
FACElProfafor does not have a system in place which ensures variety of provenance (seed origin)
between different contract partners in the region or between different contracts held by one contract
partner. In one case, 600 hectares of forest had been planted on one site using one seed 10t.221 However,
the requirement that contracts must now contain 30% native species should help with this.
Lastly, the issue of sustainability is intertwined in the decision on project lifetimes. Having a 99-
year contract encourages the ecological sustainability of a forest, but it does not necessarily ensure the
economic sustainability of the forest to the landowner. For this to happen, returns from a maturing forest
would need to keep up with the opportunity cost of land. This is by no means assured in the project
contract. There are also certain equity issues to be considered when determining the use of someone' s
land for a long period of time. Almost all forest carbon sequestration projects take place in poor rural
areas with a narrow range of income-generating activities. If one source of income in a project area is
negatively impacted, a landowner has little flexibility to compensate for it because of his obligation to
maintain his forestland as forest for almost a century or face heavy penalties. Because of the tenuous
nature of this existence, forest carbon sequestration projects could impose a severe hardship on poor rural
communities, which not only threatens the well-being of these communities but also that of the forests
themselves.
4.5 Uncertainties in International Policy and the Market in Emissions Reduction Credits
As mentioned several times above, the lack of clear and detailed guidelines for forest carbon
sequestration projects and the market in carbon offset credits has added large amounts of uncertainty to
the process of developing forest carbon sequestration projects. Some of the decisions that need to be
made in order to lessen this uncertainty are:
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4.5.1 What is the definition of afforestation and reforestation?
The definition of afforestation and reforestation are really only distinguished by the period of
time during which land was without forest. If both actions are treated equivalently in terms of
accounting, this distinction is not important for the implementation of the Kyoto Protoco1.222 However,
different definitions have different implications for the amount of land that may be available for
afforestation and reforestation activities under Article 3.3 of the Kyoto Protoco1.223 For example, if the
definition of reforestation is set to mean the establishment of trees on land that has just been logged, then
areas under conventional logging and regeneration practices would be considered reforestation carbon
sequestration projects. This could greatly increase the size of the land base available for these projects?24
It could also encourage short-term, high-turnover projects that have much different economic and
environmental effects than longer-term forest projects.
4.5.2 Will conservation and forest management be creditable under the CDM?
While forest management activities are creditable under 11, they are not creditable under the
CDM, and details on the criteria for forest management have yet to be established. Conservation is not
creditable under any current plan, so no specific criteria for it have been developed. Answering the
question of whether forest management and conservation will be creditable under the CDM is important
from an environmental perspective because there are a many pressing opportunities for both activities in
ecologically-valuable areas of the developing world that may not get undertaken if they do not have the
added benefit of producing carbon offsets. For investors, conservation and forest management are
important because they are attractive investments; they may involves lower project costs than
afforestation or reforestation projects (no need for nurseries or labor to plant trees) and they generate a
large amount of offsets up-front (no need to wait for trees to grow). They also slow the rate of
deforestation, which is the second largest factor contributing to C02 emissions to the atmosphere.
4.5.3 What are the criteria for project types approved under the CDM?
For forest carbon sequestration projects, criteria that define baseline calculations, monitoring and
verification protocols, project lifetimes, environmental sustainability, and many other details are needed
to be able to compare between projects and to lower transaction costs due to uncertainty. These details
222 Noble et al. 2000: 66.
223 Article 3.3 of the Protocol states, "The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by
sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation,
reforestation, and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment period
shall be used to meet the commitments in this Article of each Party included in Annex I."
224 Noble et al. 2000: 66.
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are scheduled to be determined by COP-9 in 2003, but until then these criteria are being vigorously
debated because of the different implications of different criteria and because projects initiated since 2000
face non-creditability if they do not contain the same criteria that are defined in COP-9, unless they are
grand fathered in some way.
4.5.4 What is the US's plan to reduce its emissions?
The US is the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases in both net and per capita terms, yet it
only has a voluntary program based on "emissions intensity" as a plan to reduce its GHG emissions. For
the second commitment period, which will be negotiated in 2005 and start in 2013, it is expected that the
US will fortify its plans to reduce its emissions (or face international opprobrium). There is also the
chance that it will ratify the Kyoto Protocol sometime in the future. Either of these actions would boost
the market in carbon offsets and spur the development of more carbon sequestration projects.
4.5.5 When will non-Annex B countries face regulation under the Kyoto Protocol?
If non-Annex B countries have to meet their own emissions reductions commitments some day,
they would be more hesitant to approve jointly-implemented forest carbon sequestration projects, as they
would want to keep their sinks to themselves. This could serve to discourage CDM-type forest carbon
sequestration projects.
4.5.6 What are the guidelines for the market in emission reduction credits?
One of the main questions regarding the emerging market in carbon offsets is the fungibility of
credits from forest carbon sequestration with credits from emissions reductions and removals in non-
LULUCF sectors. If offsets from forest carbon sequestration are fungible or if they are valued higher
than credits from non-LULUCF activities, then there would be more incentive to undertake forest carbon
sequestration projects.
4.6 Uncertainties in Host Country Capacity
There are a number of factors regarding host country capacity that either incentivize or
disincentivize the development of forest carbon sequestration projects in a host country. Some of the
factors identified in the three case studies include:
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4.6.1 Governmental Capacity
Of the three countries, Costa Rica has by far the best infrastructure set up to identify and develop
joint implementation projects in general. As the first developing country to recognize that AU projects
could be used to finance national sustainable development priorities, Costa Rica has profited from a
comprehensive strategy to promote its own sustainable development goals while helping other countries
meet their objectives under the climate change regime.225 The establishment of OCIC was an important
first step in this strategy. OCIC, which is directed by a leading forestry NOO, serves to carry out the
country's joint implementation evaluation, acceptance, and promotion activities.226 Because it is a
collaboration among the government, private, and NOO sectors, it is best situated to coordinate projects
and align them with Costa Rica's development goals. It has also established its own project approval
criteria and procedures, which in an atmosphere of regulatory uncertainty, has facilitated project
development by giving prospective projects clear guidelines to follow.
In the development of its joint implementation strategy, Costa Rica has focused on renewable
energy projects in order to help it meet its goal of using only renewable energy sources by 2010, and on
forest carbon sequestration projects to protect its hydropower resources as well as to protect the natural
areas that are important for its tourism industry. The consolidation of small projects into national-scale
programs such as the Protected Areas Project (PAP), which has unified its park system, and the Private
Forestry Project, which pays forest owners to maintain their land as forest, has also helped it fulfill its
conservation goals by securing most of its threatened forest areas.227 The PAP has also been structured to
produce SOS-certified carbon offsets, which Costa Rica sells as Certified Tradeable Offsets (CTOS).228
In 1997, Costa Rica sold 200,000 CTOs from the PAP to a consortium of private Norwegian companies at
$10 per CTO for a total of $2 million.229 Overall, Costa Rica expects to market a total of 15.7 million
CTOs from this project, which could theoretically bring in $157 million to help pay for this and other
environmental projects.230 A recent study, however, suggests that carbon savings from this project
amount to only 8.9 MtC when new data showing a slower rate of deforestation in Costa Rica is
substituted into the project baseline.231 While this new estimate still benefits Costa Rica, it highlights the
need for reliable estimates of carbon benefits in order for joint implementation to be an effective way to
combat climate change.
225Hambleton, Figueres, and Kalipada, 2000: 3.
226 Hambleton, Figueres, and Kalipada, 2000: 3.
227 Hambleton, Figueres, and Kalipada, 2000: 4.
228CTOs are measured as 1 metric ton of carbon (note: not C02)
229 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 7.
230Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 12.
231Menkhaus and Lober. 1996: 1-10.
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By September 1998, approximately $140 million had been invested in joint implementation
projects in Costa Rica.232 Its political stability, adequate institutional and legal framework, and proactive
environmental stance have all helped it to garner the majority of joint implementation projects in non-
Annex B countries?33 In contrast, neither Belize nor Ecuador have established an office to handle joint
implementation projects, and neither country has a clearly defined vision for sustainable development, let
alone the resources or the structure to carry it out. An official in the Belizean Forestry Department has
stated that while the government of Belize wants to further investigate carbon sequestration projects, no
one in the government wants to be responsible for it.234
Belize has at least gotten a start in the process of identifying its opportunities under the CDM
through the Forests and Climate Change Project in Central America (Proyecto Bosques y Cambio
Climatico en America Central), which began in September 2001 and which concludes in December
2002?35 It has also been developing a national biodiversity policy that would prioritize activities,
improve coordination among agencies, and elucidate national sustainable development goals.236 In
addition, it expects to follow through on its National Communication to the UNFCCC for 1994, which
was completed in 1998 but which still needs to be corrected and passed by the legislature before it is sent
OUt.237
Aside from the Rio Bravo project, Belize is host to the BELlMaya Biomass Power Generation
Project. Also, in December 2001, the government of Belize approved a project to reforest 36,450 hectares
of the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve, which was decimated by the southern pine bark beetle.
Along with the government of Belize, whose obligation is to protect and sustain the Mountain Pine Ridge
Forest Reserve through a long-term management plan, the project is being locally managed by three
Belizean businessmen under a venture called Silviculture Belize, Ltd., technically consulted by a
Canadian reforestation firm named Global Forest Nursery Development, Inc, and financially managed by
Forest Securities, Inc., an international forestry investment management company.238 Planting is
scheduled to begin in June 2002 with native pine seedlings grown in Belize, and project life is set at 55
years. The project is offering 5,000,000 tC for sale at $3.60/tC (18,000,000 tC02 at $1.00/tC02)?39 So
far, the project does not appear to have any investors. However, the project is indicative of the increasing
role of the government in forest carbon sequestration.
232 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 12.
233 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 4.
234 Chun, Angel. Interview January 29, 2002.
235Frutos, Ramon. Interview January 23, 2002.
236 Chun, Angel. Interview January 29, 2002.
237Frutos, Ramon. Interview January 23, 2002.
238 Reforest Belize website.
239 Reforest Belize website.
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Ecuador currently has two joint implementation projects, the FACElProfafor project and the Bilsa
Biological Reserve conservation project. Ecuador's high level of political and economic instability, weak
legal system, and record of insecure land tenure are the main factors that detract from its government's
ability to develop forest carbon sequestration or other joint-implementation projects. Its high population
density and the fact that 50% of its people live under the country's official poverty line also make forest
conservation or regeneration a challenge. However, it is an ecologically significant and threatened region
that is extremely valuable from a biodiversity standpoint. This has prompted a number of mainly
conservation organizations to set up projects in Ecuador. For example, TNC, Conservation International,
World Wildlife Fund, Wildlife Conservation Society, and CARE all have projects in Ecuador.24O The
USAID, UN, and World Bank also have several projects in Ecuador. By working with the Ministry of
Environment, FACE has given the Ecuadorian government a start in taking advantage of forest carbon
sequestration projects. FACE also helps keep the Ministry of Environment up to date on its projects as
well as on forest carbon sequestration policy in general. The government helps FACE identify potential
project areas and beneficiaries, and FACE's monitoring activities help the government register plantations
and forest preserves as required under Ecuadorian law.241
4.6.2 Scientific and Managerial Capacity
While PFB and Profafor are staffed with well-trained and committed individuals, and RTT can
rely on CACTU and CATIE to undertake monitoring activities and give technical assistance, there is a
general dearth of people knowledgeable about forest carbon sequestration projects in these countries.
This factor, along with the lack of governmental capacity, keeps forest carbon sequestration projects from
being country-driven and in the best interest of the host country.
4.6.3 Policies that Incentivize Deforestation
Until fairly recently, Costa Rica had a variety of laws that either directly or indirectly promoted
deforestation. For example, squatters could claim title to previously undisturbed forests if they cleared
and cultivated the land. These land-titling policies were reinforced by low land taxes that provided only a
small setback to those who wanted to claim land.242 In general, the key driving forces behind
deforestation in Costa Rican have been government policies to promote economic development through
subsidized loans to agriculture, especially for the coffee, sugar cane, and beef industries. Another area of
public policy that has contributed to deforestation is infrastructure development. Costa Rica has one of the
240 USAID website, "Ecuador: Activity Data Sheet."
241 lara, Louis Fernando. Interview April 5, 2002.
242 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 34.
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densest road networks in the developing world, which has served in effect as a public subsidy for those
who would convert forests to other uses?43
A measure that started to reverse the effects of these policies was the first Forestry Law in 1979.
It introduced the "first generation of incentives," which consisted of income tax deductions on
reforestation investments. The second Forestry Law, passed in 1986, provided a direct subsidy for
investments in forestry plantations and indirect support for private forestry investments. The new
Forestry Law, enacted in 1996, introduced a series of major innovations, such as payment for
environmental services and a financing mechanism via a fuel tax.244 It also establishes a ban on land use
changes and the establishment of any type of plantation on public and private forested holdings.
Furthermore, it stipulates that these holdings can only be exploited with a management plan that identifies
the potential environmental impacts.245
The Private Forestry Project, established in 1998 by OCIC to help address concerns about leakage
from the Protected Areas Project, was another major innovation. As part of the government's plan to pay
for environmental services, landowners participating in the project received payments averaging
$ 120/hectare/year for plantations, $60/hectare/year for forest protection and $45/hectare/year for forest
management and reforestation.246 One of the farmers in the Klinki project is known to have received
revenue from the Private Forestry Project for existing forests on his land.247
In Belize, the situation is very different because its low population has kept the amount of land
under forest cover quite high. However, one issue in Belize is the continued propagation of the policy of
giving short-term logging concessions to logging companies. Because of the relatively brief nature of
these concessions, logging companies have little incentive to undertake reduced-impact logging
techniques. Longer-term concessions would incentivize them to promote forest regeneration, and would
result in less damage to forestlands?48
In the Andean region of Ecuador, most of the original forest has already been logged, but the
remaining coastal and Amazonian forests are threatened by legal and illegal logging, cattle ranching, and
commercial and subsistence farming. An agrarian reform law passed in September 1994, which allows
rural farming cooperatives to split up their land amongst their members, has in some areas detracted from
reforestation activities because it has resulted in the fracture of large community landholdings into parcels
243 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 35.
244 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 5.
245 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 8.
246 Subak. June 15, 1999.
247 Rojas, Carlos Manuel. Interview March 20, 2002.
248 Novelo, Darrell. Interview January 22, 2002.
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too small to create a viable forest.249 Also, having a large number of small landowners causes transaction
costs to increase, which further discourages reforestation projects.
4.6.4 Corruption
The presence of corruption threatens forestry projects in many developing countries by
contributing to the lax enforcement of protected areas, the permission or support of illegal deforestation,
and the lack of recourse to breaches in reforestation contracts, among many other problems.
In a report by World Resources Institute and the World Wildlife Fund on the destruction of
tropical forests by multinational companies, Belize was named as one of the top countries that are
"suffering large-scale corruption.,,25o It was included in a group of other developing countries with "weak
forest services, poor monitoring capacity, inefficient tax collection and auditing capacity, and in some
cases widespread bribery and corruption" that were vulnerable. to unscrupulous foreign investors.251
Ecuador has also been named as a country vulnerable to corruption, ranking second worst in Latin
America and 79th out of 91 overall in Transparency International's 2001 corruption survey. 252USAID has
commented that corruption in Ecuador is "a serious deterrent to effective biodiversity conservation.,,253
The country also contains powerful special interests that lobby strongly against the enforcement of
forestry regulations on deforestation activities and against passage of forestry laws?54
4.6.5 Timber Markets
The small local market for timber, and especially for secondary hardwoods, was mentioned by
PFB as a disincentive for sustainable forestry practices in Belize?55 The lack of access to a market for
timber in Ecuador was also a concern of the communities with which FACE is involved. In addition,
there is only a very small export market for timber in both countries «2% of wood produced).256 Low
timber prices further lower the incentives and the means to practice sustainable forestry.
4.6.6 Infrastructure
Poor or non-existent roads can make it more difficult for forest carbon sequestration projects to
succeed. For instance, the difficulty of traveling in the Andean region of Ecuador means that the
249 Morris. 1997: 38.
250 Brown. May 29, 2000.
251Brown. May 29, 2000.
252 Note: 1 is least corrupt, 91 is most corrupt. Transparency International website, "New index highlights
worldwide corruption crisis," June 27, 2001.
253 USAID website, "Ecuador: Activity Data Sheet."
254 USAID website, "Ecuador: Activity Data Sheet."
255 Novelo, Darrell. Interview January 22, 2002.
256 CIFOR. 2001: 27.
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transport of plant material is often slow. Profafor managed this by devising a way to transport seedlings in
specially modified trucks so that the seedlings would reach the planting site without loss of quality or
vitality. Roads also playa role in the export of timber to market. In the Andes, if timber buyers have to
travel any distance from the road, prices for timber drop by approximately 50% (see Table).257 A lack of
public transportation also hinders the communities' access to local markets to sell timber and non-timber
forest products.
Figure 16 - Prices for Eucalyptus globules in the Andean region of Ecuador, 2000258
Seller Actual prices (USD/m3)
Exporter 26
Middleman 16
Community (near road) 5.2
Community (away from road) 2.8
4.6.7 Socio-economic Pressures
Socio-economic pressures that pose a challenge to forest carbon sequestration projects range by
country and by region. In Costa Rica, consumer demand and population growth are factors that have
contributed to deforestation and the establishment of pastures over forestland. Costa Rica's population
and standard of living has grown rapidly, and per capita beef consumption has grown as well. In 1960,
Costa Ricans consumed about 10 kg of beef on average per year. By 1990 that figure had grown to about
20 kg per capita annually.259
InBelize, subsistence farmers from Guatemala and Mexico have been a factor in the clearance of
forestland on Belize's borders and a threat to its protected areas. To add to this problem, one government
official stated that "We don't even know how much land use change is happening on our borders from
migrants,,260 and that the government wanted to investigate, but did not have the resources to do so by
itself. Belize's increasing agricultural demand is also a factor. In the Rio Bravo area, agriculture is
dominated by Mennonite farmers, who produce over half of Belize's maize and rice. They practice an
intense form of mechanized farming that leaves hardly a tree standing, in contrast to the subsistence
farmers, whose milpas (small-holder cornfields) coexist alongside patches of forest. This contrast is a
strong exception to the rule that poverty is the main driver of deforestation in developing countries.261
257 CIFOR. 200 1: 26.
258 Source: CIFOR. 200 1: 26.
259 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 36.
260 Fuller, Carlos. Interview January 29, 2002.
261 Brandon, Redford, Sanderson. 1998: 225.
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Figure 17 - Mennonite Field, Fallow Field, and Forest near the RBCMA262
In Ecuador, the socio-
economic pressures facing the Andean
region differ from those facing the
coastal and Amazonian lowlands. The
Andean region has a lower population
and population growth, and is under
less pressure from agro-industry and
development than the lowlands. Its
residents are primarily farmers,
ranchers, and indigenous communities
that collectively own large
landholdings, and its economy is
largely based on agriculture. These features make this area more amenable to forest carbon sequestration
projects because they represent a productive use for otherwise marginally productive or degraded land, a
source of income for people with truly limited economic opportunities, and a way to improve the
environment on which they depend.
4.6.8 Payment for Environmental Services
While forests provide ecological services that benefit society as a whole, these benefits (and the
costs imposed when the ecological services disappear) are not internalized in the decision-making of
private landholders. The failure of the market and of government policy to include these costs and
benefits means that landowners have little incentive to keep their land as forest, and are a serious
challenge to the success of forest carbon sequestration projects.263
Costa Rica's Private Forestry Project, in which landowners are paid to maintain their forests for
the environmental services they provide, has been a response to this. However, the current system of
payment for environmental services may prove to be unsustainable due to the country's fiscal situation,
which prevents it from shouldering the responsibility for the payment of these services. This has made it
necessary to limit payments to those already granted. Moreover, it has been necessary to increase the fuel
tax, which some argue creates a tax injustice because the cost of the program does not get carried by the
262 Xantha Bruso. January 2002.
263 Busch, Sathaye, and Sanchez-Azofefa. July 2000: 36.
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service user but instead by a sector of the population that does not directly enjoy the benefits derived from
these services.264
While this program could be a viable model for Costa Rica sometime in the future, it is generally
not applicable to most developing countries because of a general lack of government revenue and taxation
ability. Forest carbon sequestration projects could be used as a market-based mechanism to value
environmental services, but as shown in this chapter, a great many factors in the market, the environment,
local communities, government, and the international policy arena need to be in the right place in order
for them to be successful.
264 Cuellar, Herrador, Gonzalez, and Rosa. 1999: 13.
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Chapter 5 - Facilitating Forest Carbon Sequestration Projects
In this chapter, I formulate a set of principles and recommendations for potential stakeholders
interested in forest carbon sequestration projects. They are based on the investigation of my three case
studies and are supplemented by information gained from other projects during the course of my research.
I also outline the key considerations in the selection of a carbon sequestration project for a Massachusetts
power plant looking to offset its emissions under a new ruling by the state's Energy Facilities Siting
Board that requires new power plants with a capacity of more than 100MW offset 1% of the facility's
C02 emissions for the next 20 years.
My recommendations are guided by the primary principle that I have determined from my
research, which is that in order for jointly implemented forest carbon sequestration projects to be
successful, the benefits that a landowner receives, either indirectly through environmental benefits such as
reduced erosion or watershed protection, or directly through income from the project or from timber sales,
need to continuously equal or exceed the opportunity cost of land on which the forest is planted
throughout the project life. The fundamental challenge of carbon sequestration projects is to create a
dynamic system that gives adequate long-term returns and flexibility to landowners while maintaining a
certain level of carbon sequestration and security for investors.
For the development of this chapter, I assume that the Kyoto Protocol is ratified at COP-8 in
September 2002 and that the CDM Executive Board and the criteria for CDM projects are adopted at
COP-9 in 2003.
5.2 Recommendations to Project Managers and Investors
Once the standards are established on baseline assessment and monitoring and verification
procedures, the main issues for project managers and investors will be ensuring permanence. Permanence
depends on a number of factors, the most important of which are project location, project length, and
project benefits to landowners.
5.2.1 Project Location
The host country should preferably have a large amount of marginal or degraded land available
for reforestation or afforestation, a clearly-defined set of sustainable development goals, an office to
handle 11projects, a stable political and economic climate, a strong legal system, an equitable distribution
of legal land ownership, a progressive set of land use policies that encourages reforestation and values the
provision of environmental services, a strong local timber market as well as an export market in
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sustainably-harvested timber, adequate roads to get timber to these markets, low population growth
(including low immigration), and a low poverty rate. While this rules out almost all developing countries,
it is not entirely prohibitive. A well-designed project can help accommodate for host country
deficiencies, but there is a point at which the costs of compensating for the lack of host country capacity
override the benefits of undertaking a project in that country.
5.2.2 Project Length and Benefits to Landowners
Depending on the profile of the host country, the length of the project can then be determined.
Project length depends on both environmental and economic conditions. Obviously, project length can be
shorter where trees grow faster, but should be long enough for trees to grow to a marketable size. Aside
from this, project length should correspond largely to the opportunity cost of land and the benefits that a
landowner receives over the length of the project. If the combination of benefits that a landowner
receives, either indirectly through environmental benefits such as reduced erosion or watershed
protection, or directly through revenue from timber or non-timber forest products, do not continuously
equal or exceed the opportunity cost of land on which the forest was planted throughout the project
lifetime, the permanence of a project will be threatened.
While a shorter project life affords a landowner more flexibility and decreases the threat to
permanence for the investor, a short project lifetime is not always optimal in terms of sequestering
carbon. Mature forests store more carbon in soils and vegetation than do short-rotation plantations. Also,
a study that examined the sensitivity of carbon sequestration costs to changes in factors including the
nature of forest management and deforestation regimes, silvicultural species, agricultural prices, and
discount rates found that the costs of carbon sequestration could be greater if trees are periodically
harvested rather than permanently established.265 Therefore, a solution might be to have projects that are
renegotiable after a certain length of time or take place in, for example, 20- or 3D-year stages so as to
continuously incentivize sustainable forest management.
Threats to permanence can also be mitigated by the development of a buffer, such as the one SGS
has developed to protect against variability in emissions reductions resulting from natural disasters,
baseline calculation errors, and inconsistencies in project management. Setting aside a certain percentage
of offsets as a "hedge" against these risks is a good form of in-project insurance that helps to protect both
the project manager and the investor. As the market develops, investors might also be able to get their
credits insured by a third party as an additional form of security.
265 Newell and Stavins. November 1999: 3.
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5.2.3 Who bears the risk of impermanence?
In general, if a project fails to generate the specified number of purchased reductions, investors
prefer that sellers commit to deliver alternative reductions that could be used for compliance. However,
few if any sellers have been willing to undertake such a strong commitment since they would be exposed
to the variable and potentially high cost of producing or acquiring approved compliance tools in the
market. Instead, sellers typically agree that they may supply alternative reductions or may instead return
some, or all, of the sale proceeds to the buyer, possibly with a specified financial penalty. Sellers may be
able to claim a higher price per metric ton of reduction in return for accepting greater liability. 266
Another way to deal with the risks of impermanence could be to require an insurance policy with
the sale of the credits as a guarantee that if the project fails, the insurance company would be responsible
for replacing the carbon.
5.3 Recommendations To Host Countries
As mentioned above, investors and project managers consider a number of characteristics when
choosing a host country. However, a host country need not fulfill every requirement in order to attract
forest carbon sequestration projects, as the case of Ecuador shows. Host countries can make a few key
policy decisions that would help attract 11projects and improve their investment climate in general.
A host country needs to have a set of clearly defined sustainable development goals that could be
fulfilled through a jointly implemented forest carbon sequestration project. It also needs to establish or
designate an office or position to handle 11projects because of the multidisciplinary and cross-sectoral
nature of joint implementation, and to keep track of the different projects.
In terms of local policy, formalizing rural land tenure and clarifying land ownership through an
accurate cadastral system would help simplify project activities. Excising regressive land use policies
that encourage deforestation and implementing basic policies such as lower tax rates for forested
property, for example, would also foster the promotion of conservation and reforestation. Some key
economic moves would be to aid the development of a local timber market and encourage the formation
of a value-added export market, by, for example, helping establish a sawmill to produce building
materials. These measures would help create the demand that is necessary to ensure the profitability of
forest carbon sequestration projects.
Governments can also assist in the identification of areas that would be most suitable for carbon
sequestration projects by tracking land use trends and formulating strategic regional land use plans. For
instance, if forestry is to become a large component of a rural area's economy, a plan to establish
266 Rosenzweig, Varilek, Feldman, Kuppalli, and Janssen. March 2002: 15.
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commercial plantations on the highlands, agroforestry in the lowlands, and conservation plantings on
steep slopes could be used to focus projects where they would be most effective. Areas should also be
targeted according to their socio-economic characteristics. For instance, areas that have had experience
with plantation forestry as well as lightly populated, isolated, or degraded areas are likely to have more
success with forestry projects.
In the oversight role of carbon sequestration projects, host governments should be minimally
involved, and let the project managers and investors bear the responsibility of proving the emissions
reduced. However, governments should be willing to take a transparent and cooperative approach to
working with NGOs and the private sector in the development of forest carbon sequestration projects.
5.4 Recommendations to the Conference of Parties
In its decision on the criteria governing forest carbon sequestration projects, the COP needs to
keep in mind the needs of the most vulnerable and important stakeholders: the landowners. While USIlI
and All both require a projected emissions scenario as part of their project proposals and reports, the new
criteria should also require a projected income scenario for the landowners. For project managers and
investors, requiring a buffer or an insurance policy would help lower risk for all stakeholders.
Finally, the COP needs to address one of the most difficult issues concerning the use of forest
carbon sequestration to offset GHG emissions: the inherent impennanence of sequestering carbon in trees.
As opposed to energy efficiency projects, where a barrel of oil saved means that the C02 in that oil is
simply not emitted, forest carbon sequestration actually removes C02 from the atmosphere, but it is only
stored temporarily. When a tree rots or is burnt, much of its carbon returns to the atmosphere. If a tree is
cut down and made into a table or a house, its carbon is sequestered longer, but not pennanently.
Therefore, if an emitter wants to offset 40 tons of C02 a year for 25 years with a hectare of Klinki Matrix
trees, for example, that hectare of trees would technically need to be there pennanently in order to
pennanently offset that C02. However, the emitter has only paid to offset his 40 tons per year for 25
years, so he is really only paying for the temporary storage of carbon, not for the pennanent offset of
carbon. The incomparability between these two concepts is one of the fundamental problems in the way
carbon sequestration is currently being quantified.
One way to look at the issue of incomparability could be to equate the lifetime of C02 in the
atmosphere to the length of a forest carbon sequestration project. Because C02 exists for about 120 years
in the atmosphere, a forest carbon sequestration project should also last 120 years in order to more
accurately offset the C02 emitted. However, this amount of time is too lengthy to consider because of the
uncertainties involved in forest carbon sequestration projects, especially for this amount of time.
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Therefore, I suggest that projects be established for 20, 30, or 40 years, with a multiplier of 6, 4, or 3,
respectively, to compensate for the condensed duration of the project life. For example, if a company
needs to offset 100 tC02, it would have to invest in the sequestration of 600 tC02 'for a 20-year project,
400 tC02 for a 30-year project, or 300 tC02 for a 40-year project.
Another problem that has arisen is the question of who should bear the responsibility for carbon
that is prematurely released into the atmosphere. This is an especially complex issue if the carbon
sequestered and subsequently lost was sold in a forward stream transaction. While buffers and insurance
policies may help, another way to address this problem would be to only allow the sale of the incremental
amount of C02 that has been sequestered by the forest during the past year, minus the amount of C02
reserved for a buffer. If a percentage of the yearly sales are allocated to the landowners, the sale of
carbon offsets would help to ensure the permanence of the project by providing a steady income
(especially while the trees are too young to cut for timber) as well as an incentive to sustainably manage
the forest. Also, an incremental sale of C02 credits could yield more money overall than the discounted
value of the futures.
Even if C02 is accounted for according to a condensed 120-year project and is only sold
incrementally, the problem of a tree's carbon eventually being re-released to the atmosphere still remains.
While replanting could compensate this for, to account for carbon accurately, these new trees could not be
used towards offsetting other emissions. Because trees provide other environmental services besides
carbon sequestration, I would advocate that carbon offsets from a 120-year condensed forest carbon
sequestration project or an incremental credit should be made equivalent in permanence and fungible to
offsets from energy efficiency projects.
5.5 Advice to a Company in Need of Carbon Offsets
Despite the lack of a global consensus on climate change and the refusal of the US to join the
Kyoto Protocol, regulatory action to reduce GHG emissions has nonetheless emerged at the local level.
In April 2001, Massachusetts became the first U.S. state to impose C02 emissions limits on old fossil-
fired power plants, which have historically been subject to less stringent standards than new plants under
the Clean Air Act. The regulations apply to the state's six dirtiest power plants, which produce 40% of
the electricity used in Massachusetts. These plants will be required to reduce their C02 emissions by
10% from their 1997-1999 average emissions baseline by October 1, 2004. Reductions can be met
through energy efficiency improvements, fuel switching, installation of renewable energy installations,
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and carbon sequestration.267 Massachusetts also requires new power plants to offset a portion of their
projected C02 emissions as a condition of obtaining an operating permit.268 Specifically, the
Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Board has stipulated that new power plants with a capacity of
more than 100MW offset 1% of their facility's C02 emissions for the next 20 years, with a limit on
emission reduction costs at $1.50 per short ton.269
So far, Massachusetts' government has only issued principles to govern the use of offsets for
compliance. Specific rules for crediting of offsets have not yet been developed. At a minimum, those
seeking to invest in off-site emissions reduction or sequestration projects must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection that the reductions are real,
surplus, verifiable, permanent, and enforceable. These requirements must be met before any claimed
reduction generated by off-site projects can be applied toward the reduction requirement. The issues of
additionality (both financial and regulatory) are still under consideration as the state establishes rules
governing the use of C02 offsets for compliance.27o
Under the new requirements of the Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Board, the Mirant
Kendall Kendall Square Station power plant, located next to MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts, needs to
offset 170,000 tons of C02 equivalent to compensate for an upgrade project at its plant.271 These 170,000
tons can be supplied in a single year or over several years. In light of these requirements, I would
recommend that Mirant obtain its offsets from a multi-year forest carbon sequestration project, for the
following reasons and with a few key considerations in mind.272
5.6.1 Type of Project
A forest carbon sequestration project would be the best project in which to invest, because the
cost per ton of these projects is currently lower than that of all other options. Specifically, a forestry
project in a developing country would be the least cost activity in terms of cost per ton of C02. Since
Massachusetts requires reductions of actual OHO emissions below a specified baseline resulting from
specific and identifiable actions initiated post-2001, I would recommend that Mirant choose an
afforestation/reforestation project as opposed to a conservation project to avoid controversy over whether
conservation is an identifiable action. However, if Mirant forsees that it will require additional carbon
267 Mcelhenny, John. April 23, 2001. Note: Massachusetts by itself emits as much carbon dioxide as Austria, Egypt
or Greece.
268 Egelston, Anne. July-August 2001: 31.
269 Rosenzweig et ai, March 2002: 49.
270 Rosenzweig et ai, March 2002: 58.
271 Labrie, Laurence. April 29, 2002.
272 To give an idea of temporal and physical scale, between 1993 and the end of 1999, FACE was able to generate
over 136,000 VERs from an estimated 20,000 hectares of forest planted in Andean Ecuador.272
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offsets in the future, I would advise it to choose an afforestation/reforestation project that has a
conservation component in order to maximize the long-term carbon benefits of the project.
Figure 18 - Indicative cost curves of emission reduction or carbon sequestration by level of
total reduction.273
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5.6.2 Location of Project
In terms of which developing country Mirant should investigate for a reforestation project, the
tropical countries of Latin America would be the obvious choice. The tropics provide a fast growing
climate for trees, and there is an abundant amount of land there that is underutilized, marginally
productive, or degraded to a point where it has almost no opportunity cost. Also, most forest carbon
sequestration projects implemented to date have been in Latin America, where there is extensive
experience with both natural and plantation forestry. The high amount of biodiversity of Latin America
which is threatened by its high deforestation rate, also make an investment there worthwhile and timely
because of the project's benefits to wildlife habitat and soil, water, and air quality, and to the local
communities that depend on these features. In addition, the cost of labor and inputs in Latin America are
generally low, and countries like Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama have adequate physical and
institutional infrastructure (i.e. roads, telecommunications, banks) to support such projects, as well as
demand for wood and wood products. Mirant should focus its search on projects that take place in lightly
273 IPCC Working Group III. "Climate Change 2001: Mitigation." IPCC Third Assessment Report, 2001: Section
4.5.1.
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populated areas with limited economies, as projects there would be better received and maintained by the
communities who stand to benefit from them.
Figure 19 - Benefit-cost parameters: criteria for expected economic returns to reforestation
projects274
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5.6.3 Project Management
To manage a project in Latin America, Mirant should look for an organization that has both
experience in forest carbon sequestration and an established institutional presence in both the US or
Europe and the host country. This organization should have a long-range plan for its monitoring and
technical assistance activities and the staff and monetary base to carry them out.
274 CIFOR. 2001: 20.
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5.6.4 Project Certification
While Mirant stipulates that the seller is responsible for independent third-party verification, it
should make sure that project managers choose a reliable, credible verifier who is familiar with the
current best practices of carbon verification and who has experience in carbon sequestration projects in
the host country.
5.6.5 Project Benefits
Mirant should invest in a project that not only results in real, measurable, and verifiable carbon
offsets, but that also produces clear and continuous benefits to the owners of the land on which the trees
are planted. To this extent, Mirant should require a projected income scenario for the landowners along
with a projected emissions scenario as part of their project proposals.
5.6.6 The Future of Carbon Sequestration Projects
Massachusetts is not the only state that has begun to require GHG emissions reduction measures.
Oregon and New Hampshire also regulate C02 from the electricity sector, as does Suffolk County in New
York. The growth of both mandatory and voluntary emissions reduction programs by states, counties,
and companies will be the main drivers behind investment in forest carbon sequestration projects up to
and through the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the further development of a US GHG management
plan. As the world becomes more aware of the impact that GHGs have on our environment, forest carbon
sequestration will come to play an increasing role in the development decisions of companies and
governments as well as in the land use options of rural communities in the developing world.
Figure 20 - Local-level GHG Reduction Measures275. .. .
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275 Bubenick and Jones. March 2002: 25.
85
Chapter 6 - Conclusion
Forest carbon sequestration projects are an effective way to mitigate climate change, but they are
only one method among a portfolio of activities that the world needs to take in order to reduce GHG
emissions. While the spatial and natural limits of carbon sequestration mean that the benefits of slowing
deforestation and promoting reforestation are technically limited, the scale at which forest carbon
sequestration projects have been attempted to date leaves room for many more potential projects.
In my three case studies, I determined that the incentives behind participation in these projects
were 1) the market in carbon offsets and 2) the local economic, social, and environmental benefits. From
my other research, I can stipulate that these incentives were the same for most other forest carbon
sequestration projects. However, now that many pilot projects have been undertaken and an emerging
market in carbon commerce established, the incentives behind these projects will have to do more with
profitability and generating "real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate
change" as stated in the Kyoto Protoco1.276 Carbon offset producers such as FACE in the Netherlands and
Future Forests in the United Kingdom, along with carbon consultants and brokers like Ecosecurities,
Natsource, and C02e.com, have emerged alongside environmental NGOs like TNC to further the market
in carbon offsets. Together they are pushing the agenda on forest carbon sequestration.
The disincentives to forest carbon sequestration projects are decreasing as the Conference of
Parties to the UNFCCC meets and agrees on technical and accounting criteria and standards, and as the
Executive Board to the CDM is formed. Uncertainties in the science of carbon sequestration are also
being worked out as research progresses. Greater understanding of tree growth and ecosystem dynamics
are yielding new insights that help determine more precise baselines and emissions reduction scenarios,
and technologies such as aerial videography are being developed to undertake more accurate scientific
monitoring of natural resources and land use. This technique has been used by Winrock International and
the Nature Conservancy in projects in Bolivia and Brazil, and will be tested at the Rio Bravo project this
year.
Developing countries are getting increasingly organized around the issue of climate change and
what they can do to take advantage of their position as non-Annex B countries. The Forests and Climate
Change Project in Central America (Proyecto Bosques y Cambio Climatico en America Central) is an
example of this. Bilateral agreements between Annex B and on-Annex B countries have also been
recently negotiated. For example, in February 2002, the Netherlands and Costa Rica signed a
276 Kyoto Protocol, 1997: Article 12, Section 5b.
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Memorandum of Agreement for 30 megatons of C02 equivalent to be obtained between 2000 and
2012.177
NGOs are also furthering action on climate change mitigation around the world. The WWF
Climate Savers Program, Conservation International's involvement in The Center for Environmental
Leadership in Business, and TNC's Climate Action Projects are just a few examples of NGO-business
partnerships in this arena. To reduce the kind of market failures associated with many environmental
issues, the World Bank has also gotten involved by establishing the Prototype Carbon Fund, which is a
public and private partnership formed to pioneer the market for project based-based greenhouse gas
emissions reductions within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol and to contribute to sustainable
development.
While forest carbon sequestration projects and the market surrounding them are becoming
increasingly sophisticated, there is still a need for more interdisciplinary studies and models of costs and
benefits of these projects. Determining baselines is an inherently uncertain process that depends on many
social, economic, and environmental variables, so models that take into account factors such as the
growth rate of trees, the price of wood and other agricultural commodities, population growth, the cost of
land, and land use change, among other factors, would be helpful in quantifying the process and
investigating different scenarios.
Overall, landowners are still the most important part of carbon sequestration projects. The
benefits that a landowner receives, either indirectly through environmental benefits such as reduced
erosion or watershed protection, or directly through project payments or timber revenues, need to
continuously equal or exceed the opportunity cost of land on which the forest is planted throughout the
project life in order for a project to be successful. If landowners are not fairly compensated, the
permanence of the project and the forest itself is put at risk.
As it stands now, only stakeholders who are interested in both the financial as well as the
environmental benefits from these projects should invest their money, effort, and land in forest carbon
sequestration projects, as they are currently not 100% viable in a purely financial sense. My findings,
however, indicate that forest carbon sequestration projects, while currently risky and uncertain
investments, will become more clearly viable in the near future. Greater certainty from international
policy agreements will help to reduce the transaction costs of these projects, more experience will lead to
better project design and more mutual benefit, and greater involvement by all stakeholders, including
companies, governments, NGOs, and communities, will result in effective local environmental initiatives
that help solve the global environmental objective of mitigating climate change.
271 "Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of the Clean Development Mechanism under
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol between the Netherlands and Costa Rica," February 21,2002: Article 2.
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